



# Operations and Intelligence Report METROBANK

August 2016

BEST IN CLASS – INFORMATION SECURITY  
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS

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## ***1. About This Report***

The purpose of this document is to report on the “state” of security for your organization. It must be noted that GLESEC bases its information analysis on the systems under contract. The information generated by these systems is then aggregated, correlated and analyzed. The more complete the set of systems under contract the more accurate and complete the results will be. The report is organized to provide an executive summary with recommendations (as necessary or applicable) followed by more detailed information.

We at GLESEC believe information security is a holistic and dynamic process. This process requires on-going research and follow up. Holistic since no single “device” can provide the security necessary for an organization. Technology alone cannot provide the security necessary, but people that understand the operations and information generated by the security devices are a key to proper security. The process is dynamic since due to the nature of Internet security given the constant discovery of new security vulnerabilities and exploits, the proliferation of hacking tools that make it easier for script-kiddies with minimal knowledge to cause damage. The increase in malware, phishing, insider threats, espionage, organized crime, intellectual property theft, and hacktivism are the very cause of information security exposure and are most commonly driven by financial gain.

## ***2. Confidentiality***

GLESEC considers the confidentiality of client’s information as a trade-secret. The information in this context is classified as:

- a) Client name and contact information
- b) System architecture, configuration, access methods and access control
- c) Security content

All the above information is kept secure to the extent in which GLESEC secures its own confidential information.

### 3. Scope of This Report

#### GLESEC Contracted Services

MSS: Managed Security Service (full outsourcing)

| Service | Manufacturer | Model                  | Update Expiration | Service Expiration |
|---------|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| MSS-APS | Radware      | DefensePro 516 ODS2-S1 | 06/1/2016         | 06/1/2017          |
| MSS-APS | Radware      | AppWall ODS1XL         | 06/1/2016         | 06/1/2017          |
| MSS-VME |              |                        | 06/1/2016         | 06/1/2017          |

### 4. Executive Summary

This report corresponds to the period from August 1, 2016 to August 31, 2016.

This month we are seeing a decrease in attack activity from prior month and also a decline in critical attacks over the prior month. Most of the attacks are short in duration (less than a minute) and most are targeting multiple ports. A very large percentage of the attacks are coming from known threat sources that GLESEC gathers and correlates with the information produced by the protection systems (DefensePro). As usual others mostly from Panama with China as second culprit follow the attacks. A significant number of attacks are scanning which can be considered reconnaissance and is what precedes further attacks. The duration of the attacks is mostly less than a minute indicating reconnaissance activity which is further supported by the “multiple” port scanning.

Ten (10) out of twenty-three (23) of the hosts that are seen from the Internet have vulnerabilities. The number of vulnerabilities are 71, 20 medium and 51 low that should be addressed.

The systems have operated with 100% availability and good response time.

#### Risk Value

To provide a way to quantify the risk of a Company, GLESEC introduces a definition for a metric value to capture the exposure risk that allow to evaluate the objective vulnerabilities and also the record of change over time. This procedure to qualify can be used to evaluate the ROI in the security measures we have implemented.

It is important to mention that this metric considers a median value for the vulnerabilities classified as "high", "medium" and "low", given them a value of 100% 50% and 10% to each, so the factor of the total number of system that are vulnerable.

This takes into consideration all of the vulnerabilities, but is important to point out that this values (100, 50 and 10) are arbitrary chosen by us, so this measure can in time change as we understand more of the risk involved. We can use this metric to evaluate the progress in time and to compare one over the other using a common amount set.

| Total IP's Scanned           |        |       | IP's Vulnerable |  |
|------------------------------|--------|-------|-----------------|--|
| 23                           |        |       | 10              |  |
| Risk Distribution            |        |       |                 |  |
| High                         | Medium | Low   | Total           |  |
| 0                            | 20     | 51    | 71              |  |
| Risk Value                   |        | 0.092 |                 |  |
| Vulnerabilities Weighted Sum |        |       | 0.213           |  |

According to the metrics:

RV= 0.092

The following values are to clarify RV:

RV=1 Points to every IP address in the infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks

RV=0 Points to no IP address in the infrastructure are susceptible to attacks

RV=0.1 Point to 1/10 IP address in the infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks


## Attack Summary

Based on the information gathered from the DefensePro during this period **219,358** attacks on METROBANK, **104,877** of which were considered critical were all stopped by the Radware devices.

METROBANK receives an average of **258,514** total attacks and **76,318** critical attacks on a monthly basis which equates to an average of **8,797** total daily attacks and **2,598** critical daily attacks. As the graph illustrates total attack levels in relation to the previous report period

totalled **279,229** total attacks and critical attacks in compared with a last period's total of **115,050**.

This statistical graph provides the count of critical and total attacks blocked per month calculated on a rolling 12 month period (Last 12 months)




Comparison of previous month with month actual.

| Description                            | July    | August  |
|--|---------|---------|
| <b>Total Attack</b>                    | 279,229 | 219,358 |
| <b>Critical Attacks</b>                | 115,050 | 104,887 |
| <b>Monthly attack average</b>          | 231,655 | 258,514 |
| <b>Daily Attack Average</b>            | 9,007   | 8,797   |
| <b>Monthly Critical attack average</b> | 34,432  | 76,318  |
| <b>Daily Critical Attack Average</b>   | 1,487   | 2,598   |

## Geography


The vast majority of attacks on Metrobank originated geographically from the following Top 10 countries: **United States, Panama, United Kingdom, China, Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, Netherlands, Colombia, Argentina** listed in order of frequency. The attacks that we observed are happening to companies all around the world. Geographic borders offer little or no protection against cyber-attacks, in fact just the opposite is true offering more opportunity for anyone to carry out an attack.



\*Please view the Maps, and [Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked](#), [Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked by Attack Type](#), [Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked by Protocol](#) available in the Security Intelligence section of the report.

## Category Distribution

Category distribution for this report period is illustrated and detailed below.



## Behavioral-DoS accounted for 44.95% of attacks during this report period

The B-DoS system protects against Network Flood Attacks, which cause a great deal of irrelevant traffic to fill available network bandwidth, denying the use of network resources to legitimate users.

Network Flood protection types include:

SYN Flood, TCP Flood, UDP Flood, ICMP Flood, IGMP Flood

### **Scanning accounted for 38.35 % of attacks during this report period**

Network-wide Anti-Scanning protections dropped enumeration attempts which otherwise thwart any effort for threat modelling, commonplace after the information gathering phase of a targeted or planned attack.

### **Packet Anomalies accounted for 4.9 % of attacks during this report period**

This anomalous traffic is usually caused by attacks or evasion tactics directed at the network devices such as firewalls in order to bypass their functions which if allowed to pass could permit scanning of the internal network or overloading the central processing unit of the device rendering it unusable and effectively causing a network bottleneck or DoS condition. They are also used as a method to collapse the underlying network infrastructure with packet crafting tools used by threat agents to interrupt services or distract security teams with volumetric attacks while more targeted attacks are directed at important assets to allow for data exfiltration. Packet Anomalies can also be caused by applications that do not adhere to RFC standards.

### **Access accounted for 7.6 % of attacks during this report period**


Access category relates directly to blacklists configured by GLESEC on the DefensePro for known threat sources.

### **Intrusions accounted for 3.0 % of attacks during this report period**

These include vulnerability-based threats such as: Worms and Botnets; Trojan horses and the creation of backdoors; Vendor-specific exploitation vulnerabilities in products e.g., Microsoft, Oracle; Exploitation of vulnerabilities in applications such as web, mail, VoIP, DNS, SQL; Spyware, Phishing, anonymizes.

## Duration

Attack duration for specific categories for this report period is illustrated below.



## Bandwidth

Behavioral-DoS dropped **60.97 Gbps**, Anti-scanning protection dropped **0.58 Gbps**, Access dropped **0.58 Gbps** of total traffic, **0.10 Gbps** dropped by Intrusion protection rules, Cracking protection dropped **0.01 Gbps**. A total of **62.25 Gbps** of malicious traffic was discarded this period.


|   | Category ↕                   | Gbps ↕ | Mbps ↕   |
|---|------------------------------|--------|----------|
| 1 | Behavioral-DoS               | 60.97  | 62432.38 |
| 2 | Anti-Scanning                | 0.58   | 598.09   |
| 3 | Access                       | 0.58   | 593.93   |
| 4 | Intrusions                   | 0.10   | 106.04   |
| 5 | Cracking-Protection          | 0.01   | 14.21    |
| 6 | Anomalies                    | 0.01   | 12.35    |
| 7 | Total Bandwidth in Gbps/Mbps | 62.25  | 63757.00 |

\*Please view the [Bandwidth Information](#), and [Graph: Bandwidth by Blocked Threat Category by Hour of Day](#) and [Graph: Top Attacks Blocked by Bandwidth](#) and [Graph: Attack Categories Blocked by Bandwidth](#) available in the Security Intelligence section of the report.

## Port Activity

The advanced intrusion detection and prevention capabilities offered by the DefensePro IPS NBA, DoS and Reputation Service provides maximum protection for network elements, hosts and applications. It is composed of different application-level protection features to prevent intrusion attempts such as worms, Trojan horses and single-bullet attacks, facilitating complete and high-speed cleansing of all malicious intrusions.

The DefensePro assisted in preventing attacks directed at network and server level which were directed at well-known port numbers: **23** (telnet), **4500** (ipsec-nat-t), **5060** (sip), **1433** (ms-sql), **443** (https), **3306** (mysql), **80** (http), **22** (ssh), **3389** (rdp) in order of frequency for this report period.




Port number information utilized is based on [IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry](#) and additional outside sources are used to illustrate the relationship to commonly exploited attacks vectors.

\*Please view the [Port Information](#), and [Graph: Attacks Blocked by Destination Port](#) and [Graph: Top Probed Applications Blocked](#) available in the Security Intelligence section of the report.

## Known Threat Sources by Threat Type

**26,527** attacks on METROBANK are from known threat sources that have been compiled and correlated with attack source IPs gathered from the DefensePro attack logs and outside sources such as honeypots, known malicious sources, vulnerability databases, relationships with CERT and CSIRT teams that GLESEC possesses, together with various other threat feeds.



## Vulnerability Summary

The following network ranges for METROBANK was scanned for vulnerabilities.

A total of **23** hosts were scanned **10** of which were found to be vulnerable.

Vulnerabilities were detected for the following host IPs:

| Vulnerabilities by Host and Risk Level  |       |      |        |     |
|---|-------|------|--------|-----|
| Host                                    | Total | High | Medium | Low |
| 190.34.183.131                          | 1     | 0    | 0      | 1   |
| 190.34.183.132                          | 6     | 0    | 0      | 6   |
| 190.34.183.138                          | 1     | 0    | 0      | 1   |
| 190.34.183.144                          | 24    | 0    | 9      | 15  |
| 190.34.183.148 (correo.metrobanksa.com) | 1     | 0    | 0      | 1   |
| 190.34.183.149                          | 11    | 0    | 2      | 9   |
| 190.34.183.152                          | 2     | 0    | 0      | 2   |
| 190.34.183.153                          | 6     | 0    | 2      | 4   |
| 190.34.183.154                          | 7     | 0    | 1      | 6   |
| 190.34.183.158                          | 12    | 0    | 6      | 6   |

## Vulnerability –Current Month and Previous Month

A comparison of persistent vulnerabilities of the current month and previous month.

Please view [Recommendations](#) for more details.

| ip             | previous month | current month |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| 190.34.183.130 | 1              | 0             |
| 190.34.183.131 | 8              | 1             |
| 190.34.183.132 | 3              | 6             |
| 190.34.183.138 | 0              | 1             |
| 190.34.183.139 | 13             | 0             |
| 190.34.183.144 | 15             | 24            |
| 190.34.183.148 | 1              | 1             |
| 190.34.183.149 | 2              | 11            |
| 190.34.183.152 | 0              | 2             |
| 190.34.183.153 | 3              | 6             |
| 190.34.183.154 | 1              | 7             |
| 190.34.183.158 | 12             | 12            |

## Risk Distribution

Category distribution for this report period is illustrated and detailed below.

Based on the information gathered from the GLESEC Automated Vulnerability Detection System (AVDS) a total of **71 Vulnerabilities** were found which consisted of **0 High Risk Vulnerabilities**, **20 Medium Risk Vulnerabilities** and **51 Low Risk Vulnerabilities** during this period.

## High risk vulnerabilities accounted for 0 % of the discoveries during this report period

High are defined as being in one or more of the following categories: Backdoors, full Read/Write access to files, remote Command Execution, Potential Trojan Horses, or critical Information Disclosure (e.g. passwords).

## Medium risk vulnerabilities accounted for 28 % of the discoveries during this report period

Medium describes vulnerabilities that either expose sensitive data, directory browsing and traversal, disclosure of security controls, facilitate unauthorized use of services or denial of service to an attacker.

## Low risk vulnerabilities accounted for 72 % of the discoveries during this report period

Low describes vulnerabilities that allow preliminary or sensitive information gathering for an attacker or pose risks that are not entirely security related but maybe used in social-engineering or similar attacks.

## Vulnerability Categories

Most frequent type of vulnerabilities.

|   |                               |    |                     |    |                   |
|---|-------------------------------|----|---------------------|----|-------------------|
| 1 | Preliminary Analysis          | 9  | Firewalls           | 17 | Network Devices   |
| 2 | SMB/NetBIOS                   | 10 | SSH Servers         | 18 | Malformed Packets |
| 3 | Simple Network Services       | 11 | Mail Servers        | 19 | Proxy Servers     |
| 4 | Policy Checks                 | 12 | SQL Servers         | 20 | Wireless AP       |
| 5 | Web Servers                   | 13 | FTP Servers         | 21 | Webmail Servers   |
| 6 | RPC Services                  | 14 | Server Side Scripts | 22 | NFS Services      |
| 7 | Backdoors                     | 15 | SNMP Services       | 23 | Printers          |
| 8 | Encryption and Authentication | 16 | DNS Servers         |    |                   |

The list below indicate your vulnerability most frequent:

Preliminary analysis with **17** detections total vulnerabilities, Web Servers with **14** detections, Encryption and Authentication with **12** detected instances, SMB/NetBIOS with **10** detections,

Policy Checks with **6** detections, Simple Network Services with **5** detections, SQL servers with **3** detections, Backdoors with **2** detections, Mail servers with **2** for the report period.

| Vulnerabilities by Category   |       |      |        |     |
|-------------------------------|-------|------|--------|-----|
| Category                      | Total | High | Medium | Low |
| Encryption and Authentication | 12    | 0    | 3      | 9   |
| SMB/NetBIOS                   | 10    | 0    | 6      | 4   |
| Backdoors                     | 2     | 0    | 2      | 0   |
| Simple Network services       | 5     | 0    | 2      | 3   |
| Mail servers                  | 2     | 0    | 0      | 2   |
| SQL servers                   | 3     | 0    | 3      | 0   |
| Web servers                   | 14    | 0    | 2      | 12  |
| Policy Checks                 | 6     | 0    | 2      | 4   |
| Preliminary Analysis          | 17    | 0    | 0      | 17  |

## Preliminary Analysis vulnerabilities accounted for 23.9 % of the discoveries during this report period

Authentication and encryption are two intertwined technologies that help to insure that your data remains secure. Authentication is the process of insuring that both ends of the connection are in fact who they say they are. This applies not only to the entity trying to access a service (such as an end user) but to the entity providing the service, as well (such as a file server or Web site). Encryption helps to insure that the information within a session is not compromised. This includes not only reading the information within a data stream, but altering it, as well.

While authentication and encryption each has its own responsibilities in securing a communication session, maximum protection can only be achieved when the two are combined. For this reason, many security protocols contain both authentication and encryption specifications.

## **Web Server vulnerabilities accounted for 19.7 % of the discoveries during this report period**

Various high-profile hacking attacks have proven that web security remains the most critical issue to any business that conducts its operations online. Web servers are one of the most targeted public faces of an organization, because of the sensitive data they usually host. Securing a web server is as important as securing the website or web application itself and the network around it. If you have a secure web application and an insecure web server, or vice versa, it still puts your business at a huge risk. Your company's security is as strong as its weakest point.

## **Encryption and Authentication vulnerabilities accounted for 16.9 % of the discoveries during this report period**

Authentication and encryption are two intertwined technologies that help to insure that your data remains secure. Authentication is the process of insuring that both ends of the connection are in fact who they say they are. This applies not only to the entity trying to access a service (such as an end user) but to the entity providing the service, as well (such as a file server or Web site). Encryption helps to insure that the information within a session is not compromised. This includes not only reading the information within a data stream, but altering it, as well.

While authentication and encryption each has its own responsibilities in securing a communication session, maximum protection can only be achieved when the two are combined. For this reason, many security protocols contain both authentication and encryption specifications.

## **SMB/NetBIOS vulnerabilities accounted for 14.1 % of the discoveries during this report period**

SMB/NetBIOS vulnerabilities could allow remote code execution on affected systems. An attacker who successfully exploit these vulnerabilities could install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Firewall best practices and standard default firewall configurations can help protect networks from attacks that originate outside the enterprise perimeter. Best practices recommend that systems that are connected to the Internet have a minimal number of ports exposed.

## **Simple Network Service vulnerabilities accounted for 7.0 % of the discoveries during this report period**

Simple Network vulnerabilities affect protocols like NTP, ICMP and common network applications like SharePoint among others. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list.

## Mail Server vulnerabilities accounted for 2.8 % of the discoveries during this report period.

A mail server is the computerized equivalent of your friendly neighborhood mailman. Spammers sometimes send a flood of traffic that overwhelms an email server. The result is sluggish email delivery, delaying legitimate messages from reaching their intended recipients on your network.

## 5. Recommendations

GLESEC recommends for METROBANK to address the following vulnerabilities assigned a Medium Risk by the GLESEC AVDS.

### Description

MICROSOFT'S SQL TCP/IP LISTENER

### Category

SQL servers

The remote host is running MSSQL, a database server from Microsoft. It is possible to extract the version number of the remote installation from the server pre-login response.

190.34.183.144 : ms-sql-s (1433/tcp) The remote SQL Server version is 10.50.2500.0.

### Impact:

Attackers can gain critical information about the host.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : ms-sql-s (1433/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

Block access to the SQL server from the outside.

### Description

SHARED DIRECTORY ACCESS (LOGIN)

### Category

Policy Checks

We tried to access the password protected shared directory using several login/password combinations.

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp) - NULL sessions are enabled on the remote host  
190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp) - NULL sessions are enabled on the remote host

## Impact:

Attackers have read/write access to your shares, and can possibly login to the server remotely.

Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)  
190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

\* Disabling Logging of Anonymous Logon Events (on Windows XP and later) You can completely disable anonymous logons (aka NULL sessions), but doing so might affect accessibility by users in trusting domains. Before changing policies throughout your domain, we suggest testing them on a limited number of systems. Windows XP and later provide the six policies listed below for controlling what information can be accessed anonymously. (These policies are in the Microsoft Management Console-MMC-Local Security Policy snap-in under Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\SecuritySettings\\Local Policies\\SecurityOptions.)

1. Network access: Allow anonymous SID/Name translation
2. Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts
3. Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares
4. Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users
5. Network access: Named Pipes that can be accessed anonymously
6. Network access: Shares that can be accessed anonymously

The default values for these policies are acceptable for servers on a typical internal LAN. For hardened servers, such as Internet servers, we recommend disabling policies 1 and 4, enabling policies 2 and 3, and specifying empty lists for policies 5 and 6. You can't specifically disable logging of anonymous logon events. In general, trying to prevent Windows from logging "noise" is futile. The only approach that works is to implement a log management solution that filters out the noise for you.

## Description

WINDOWS TERMINAL SERVICE DETECTION

## Category

Backdoors

The Terminal Services are enabled on the remote host. Terminal Services allow a Windows user to remotely obtain a graphical login and therefore act as a local user on the remote host.

### Impact:

If an attacker gains a valid login and password, he may be able to use this service to gain further access on the remote host.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : ms-wbt-server (3389/tcp)

190.34.183.158 : ms-wbt-server (3389/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

Disable the Terminal Services if you do not use them. If you wish to enable Terminal Service, consider securing the connection via IPsec:

Windows Server 2003:

<http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?kbid=816521&product=winsvr2003>

Windows 2000:

<http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;315055>

If you use Windows 2003 server, consider SSL encryption with specific client side certificates:

<http://technet2.microsoft.com/WindowsServer/en/Library/a92d8eb9-f53d-4e86-ac9b-29fd6146977b1033.mspx?mfr=true>

For more information on how Terminal Service encryption works see:

<http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;186572>

### Description

### Category

SMB LISTENS ON PORT

SMB/NetBIOS

Ports 139 and 445 are used for 'NetBIOS' communication between two Windows 2000 hosts. In the case of port 445 an attacker may use this to perform NetBIOS attacks as it would on port 139.

### Impact:

All NetBIOS attacks are possible on this host.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp) netbios-ssn (139/tcp) 190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp) netbios-ssn (139/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

Filter incoming traffic to this port.

### Description

### Category

MICROSOFT WINDOWS REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL SERVER PRIVATE KEY DISCLOSURE  
Simple Network services

The remote version of Remote Desktop Protocol Server (Terminal Service) is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack.

### Impact:

An attacker may exploit this flaw to decrypt communications between client and server and obtain sensitive information (passwords, ...).

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : ms-wbt-server (3389/tcp)  
190.34.183.158 : ms-wbt-server (3389/tcp)

### Description

### Category

DATABASE REACHABLE FROM THE INTERNET SQL servers  
The remote host is running a database server that is reachable from the Internet.  
190.34.183.144 : ms-sql-s (1433/tcp) - A MS SQL server is listening on this port.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : ms-sql-s (1433/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

Filter incoming traffic to this port.

### Description

### Category

SMB SIGNING DISABLED SMB/NetBIOS

Signing is disabled on the remote SMB server. This can allow man-in-the-middle attacks against the SMB server. SMB servers should both require signatures as well as support them.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

Enforce message signing in the host's configuration. On Samba, the setting is called 'server signing'.

On Windows Servers: \*

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters

Value Name: EnableSecuritySignature Data Type: REG\_DWORD Data: 1 (enable) Value Name:

RequireSecuritySignature Data Type: REG\_DWORD Data: 1 (enable)

On Windows Desktops: \*

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManWorkstation\Parameters

Value Name: EnableSecuritySignature Data Type: REG\_DWORD Data: 1 (enable) Value Name:

RequireSecuritySignature Data Type: REG\_DWORD Data: 1 (enable)

### Description

### Category

VULNERABILITY IN SQL SERVER ALLOWS ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE (MS12-070, NETWORK)  
SQL servers

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the SQL Server Report Manager in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Reporting Services SP2 and SQL Server 2005 SP4, 2008 SP2 and SP3, 2008 R2 SP1, and 2012 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via an unspecified parameter, aka "Reflected XSS Vulnerability."

### Impact:

An attacker would need to entice a user to visit a specially crafted link in order to exploit the vulnerability.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : ms-sql-s (1433/tcp)

### Possible Solution:

See solution provided at: <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-070>

## Description

DEPRECATED SSL PROTOCOL USAGE

## Category

Encryption and Authentication

The remote service accepts connections encrypted using SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, which reportedly suffers from several cryptographic flaws and has been deprecated for several years. An attacker may be able to exploit these issues to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or decrypt communications between the affected service and clients.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.149 : https (443/tcp)pop3s (995/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

Consult the application's documentation to disable SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0, and use TLS 1.0 or newer.

## Description

WEB SERVER CROSS SITE SCRIPTING

## Category

Web servers

The remote web server seems to be vulnerable to the Cross Site Scripting vulnerability. The vulnerability is caused when the result returned to the user when a non-existing file is requested contains the original URL (e.g. the result contains the JavaScript provided in the request). The vulnerability would allow an attacker to make the server present the user with the attacker's JavaScript/HTML code. Since the content is presented by the server, the user will give it the trust level of the server (for example, the trust level of banks, shopping centers, etc. would usually be high). (NOTE: Some browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox encode characters such as lower-than/greatthan, making the recreation of the vulnerability via the browser impossible) 190.34.183.153 : http-alt (8080/tcp)

## Impact:

Attackers can run a cross-site-scripting attack on your server. More information about CSS can be found at: [http:// www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html](http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html)

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.153 : http-alt (8080/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

Allaire/Macromedia Jrun:

<http://www.macromedia.com/software/jrun/download/update/>

<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5TP0D2A0KA.html>

Microsoft IIS:

<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5YP0M1F2AM.html>

<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/6E0011F60I.html>

Apache:

<http://httpd.apache.org/info/css-security/>

General:

<http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/5IP000K0LI.html>

<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html>

## Description

APACHE TOMCAT XSRF TOKEN DISCLOSURE

## Category

Web servers

The Manager and Host Manager applications in Apache Tomcat 7.x before 7.0.68, 8.x before 8.0.31, and 9.x before 9.0.0.M2 establish sessions and send CSRF tokens for arbitrary new requests, which allows remote attackers to bypass a CSRF protection mechanism by using a token.

## Impact:

An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to obtain a valid cross-site request forgery (XSRF) token during the redirect issued when requesting /manager/ or /host-manager/. This token can be utilized by an attacker to construct an XSRF attack.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.153 : unknown (8075/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

Upgrade to Apache Tomcat version 7.0.68, Apache Tomcat version 8.0.32, Apache Tomcat version 9.0.0.M3 or newer.

## Description

SSL MEDIUM STRENGTH CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED

## Category

Encryption and Authentication

The remote host supports the use of SSL ciphers that offer medium strength encryption, which we currently regard as those with key lengths at least 56 bits and less than 112 bits.

190.34.183.154 : https (443/tcp)

Here is the only medium strength SSL cipher supported by the remote server:

- \* Medium Strength Ciphers ( $\geq 56$ -bit and  $< 112$ -bit key)
- \* TLSv1 - EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=DES(56) Mac=SHA1

The fields above are:

- \* {OpenSSL ciphername}
- \* Kx={key exchange}
- \* Au={authentication}
- \* Enc={symmetric encryption method}
- \* Mac={message authentication code}
- \* {export flag}

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.154 : https (443/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

Reconfigure the affected application if possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers.

**GLESEC further recommends for METROBANK to address the following vulnerabilities assigned a Low Risk by the GLESEC AVDS.**

## Description

ICMP Timestamp Request

## Category

Preliminary Analysis

The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This allows an attacker to know the time and date on your host.

## Impact

This may help attackers to defeat time based authentications schemes.

## Systems Affected

190.34.183.131 : general (icmp)

190.34.183.144 : general (icmp)

190.34.183.158 : general (icmp)

## Solution

See solution provided at: <http://www.beyondsecurity.com/faq/questions/54/how-can-i-mitigate-icmp-timestamp>

## Description

IPSEC IKE Detection

## Category

Encryption and Authentication

The remote host seems to be enabled to do Internet Key Exchange (IKE). This is typically indicative of a VPN server. VPN servers are used to connect remote hosts into internal resources.

## Systems Affected

190.34.183.132 : isakmp (500/udp)

## Solution

You should ensure that:

- 1) The VPN is authorized for your Companies computing environment
- 2) The VPN utilizes strong encryption
- 3) The VPN utilizes strong authentication

## Description

NTP Variables Reading

## Category

Simple Network services

It is possible to determine a lot of information about the remote host by querying the NTP variables - these include OS descriptor, and time settings. Theoretically one could work out the NTP peer relationships and track back network settings from this.

## Impact

Attackers can gain critical information about the host.

## Systems Affected

190.34.183.158 : ntp (123/udp)

## Solution

Set NTP to restrict default access to ignore all info packets: restrict default ignore

## Description

SSL VERIFICATION TEST

## Category

Encryption and Authentication

This test connects to a SSL server, and checks its certificate and the available ciphers. Weak (export version) ciphers are reported as problematic.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.132 : https (443/tcp)

190.34.183.149 : https (443/tcp)pop3s (995/tcp)

190.34.183.154 : https (443/tcp)

## Possible Solution:

Usage of weak ciphers should be avoided.

## Description

NETBIOS INFORMATION RETRIEVAL

## Category

SMB/NetBIOS

We tried to use NetBIOS over TCP/IP to find information about your computer. The following information was retrieved:

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : netbios-ns (137/tcp)

190.34.183.158 : netbios-ns (137/tcp)

-----

190.34.183.144 : netbios-ns (137/tcp)

The following 3 NetBIOS names have been gathered

TEC-APC = Computer name

METROBANK = Workgroup / Domain name

TEC-APC = File Server Service

The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter: 00:0c:29:83:f0:4d

190.34.183.158 : netbios-ns (137/tcp)

The following 4 NetBIOS names have been gathered

MTBOFICONTAB = Computer name METROBANK = Workgroup / Domain name

MTBOFICONTAB = File Server Service METROBANK = Browser Service Elections

The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter: 00:1e:4f:e5:e1:7e

## Impact:

If NetBIOS is enabled and open to the outside, attackers may try to reach shared directories and files. This also gives sensitive information to the attacker such as the computer name, domain, or workgroup.

## Possible Solution:

The recommended solution is to block it in your firewall (or even your router, using ACLs). If you have 2 network interfaces, remove the binding for 'disk and printer' sharing from the external network interface. For your general information, here is how to disable NetBIOS: <http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/3E5PUR5QAY.html>

## Description

IDENTIFY UNKNOWN SERVICES VIA GET REQUESTS

## Category

Preliminary Analysis

This test is a complement of Service test, as it tries recognize more banners and use an HTTP request if necessary.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144, 190.34.183.149, 190.34.183.152, 190.34.183

190.34.183.144 : http (80/tcp)

A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.144 : http-alt (8080/tcp)

A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.144 : unknown (4570/tcp)

A MySQL server seems to be running on this port but it rejects connection from the scanner.

190.34.183.144 : unknown (47001/tcp)

A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.144 : unknown (5985/tcp)

A web server is running on this port  
190.34.183.144 : unknown (7981/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.149 : http (80/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port  
190.34.183.149 : https (443/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.152 : http (80/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port  
190.34.183.152 : https (443/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port

190.34.183.154 : http (80/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port  
190.34.183.154 : https (443/tcp)  
A web server is running on this port

## Description

VMWARE HOST DETECTION

## Category

Simple Network services

The remote host seems to be a VMWare virtual machine running the Microsoft Windows Operating system. Since it is physically accessible through the network, you should ensure that its configuration matches the one of your corporate security policy.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : general (tcp)

## Description

NULL SESSION AVAILABLE (SMB)

## Category

Policy Checks

The remote host is running one of the Microsoft Windows operating systems. It was possible to log into it using a NULL session. A NULL session (no login/password) allows to get information about the remote host.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

### Description

REGISTRY ACCESS FAILED (SMB)

### Category

Policy Checks

It was not possible to connect to PIPE\winreg on the remote host. If you intend to perform registry-based checks, the registry checks will not work because the 'Remote Registry Access' service (winreg) has been disabled on the remote host or can not be connected to with the supplied credentials.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

190.34.183.158 : microsoft-ds (445/tcp)

### Description

WINDOWS HOST NETBIOS TO INFORMATION RETRIEVAL

### Category

SMB/NetBIOS

The remote host listens on udp port 137 and replies to NetBIOS nbtscan requests. By sending a wildcard request it is possible to obtain the name of the remote system and the name of its domain.

### Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.144 : netbios-ns (137/udp)

190.34.183.158 : netbios-ns (137/udp)

190.34.183.144 : netbios-ns (137/udp)

The following 3 NetBIOS names have been gathered

TEC-APC = Computer name

METROBANK = Workgroup / Domain name

TEC-APC = File Server Service

The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter: 00:0c:29:83:f0:4d

190.34.183.158 : netbios-ns (137/udp)

The following 4 NetBIOS names have been gathered

MTBOFICONTAB = Computer name

METROBANK = Workgroup / Domain name

MTBOFICONTAB = File Server Service

METROBANK = Browser Service Elections

The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter: 00:1e:4f:e5:e1:7e

## Description

SMTP SERVICE STARTTLS COMMAND SUPPORT

## Category

Mail servers

The remote SMTP service supports the use of the 'STARTTLS' command to switch from a plaintext to an encrypted communications channel.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.148 (correo.metrobanksa.com) : smtp (25/tcp)

190.34.183.149 (correo.metrobanksa.com) : smtp (25/tcp)

## Description

IIS CONTENT-LOCATION HTTP HEADER

## Category

Web servers

By default, in Internet Information Server (IIS), the Content-Location references the IP address of the server rather than the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or Hostname. This header may expose internal IP addresses that are usually hidden or masked behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) Firewall or proxy server.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.149 : https (443/tcp)

When processing the following request:

GET / HTTP/1.0

this web server leaks the following private IP address: 10.1.1.235 as found in the following collection of HTTP headers: HTTP/1.1 302 Redirect Content-Type: text/html charset=UTF-8 Location: https://10.1.1.235/owa/ Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Sat, 03 Sep 2016 06:08:27 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 146

## Impact:

If this contains internal IP address information, attackers may gain critical information about the host.

## Possible Solution:

See solution provided at: <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/218180>

## Description

APACHE TOMCAT SERVLET/JSP CONTAINER DEFAULT FILES

## Category

Web servers

The Apache Tomcat servlet/JSP container has default files installed. These files should be removed as they may help an attacker to guess the exact version of the Apache Tomcat which is running on this host and may provide other useful information. Default files:

- \* /tomcat-docs/index.html
- \* /examples/servlets/index.html
- \* /examples/servlet/SnoopServlet
- \* /examples/jsp/snp/snoop.jsp
- \* /examples/jsp/index.html

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.153 : unknown (8075/tcp)

## Description

APACHE TOMCAT DEFAULT ERROR PAGE VERSION DETECTION

## Category

Web servers

Apache Tomcat appears to be running on the remote host and reporting its version number on the default error pages.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.153 : unknown (8075/tcp)

We have found the following version information on an Apache Tomcat 404 page or in the HTTP

Source: <title>Apache Tomcat/7.0.59

Installed version: 7.0.59

Note: The version detected on the server appears to be backported.

## Possible Solution:

Replace the default error pages with custom error pages to hide the version number. Refer to the Apache wiki or the Java Servlet Specification for more information.

## Description

HTTP SERVER BACKPORTED SECURITY PATCHES

## Category

Web servers

Security patches may have been 'back ported' to the remote HTTP server without changing its version number. Banner-based checks have been disabled to avoid false positives.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.153 : unknown (8075/tcp)

190.34.183.154 : http (80/tcp)

## Description

NTP VARIABLES READING

## Category

Simple Network services

It is possible to determine a lot of information about the remote host by querying the NTP variables - these include OS descriptor, and time settings. Theoretically one could work out the NTP peer relationships and track back network settings from this.

## Host(s) affected:

190.34.183.158 : ntp (123/udp)

## Impact:

Attackers can gain critical information about the host.

## Possible Solution:

Set NTP to restrict default access to ignore all info packets: restrict default ignore

GLESEC recommends "Implementing the First Five Quick Wins" based on the Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, Version 4.1 that were formulated as a joint effort from the NSA, US Cert, DoD JTF-GNO, the Department of Energy Nuclear Laboratories, Department of State, DoD Cyber Crime Center plus the top commercial forensics experts and

pen testers that serve the banking and critical infrastructure communities. These are readily available from GLESEC which has provided the following link: [Top 20 Critical Security Controls](#)

The Critical Controls represent the biggest bang for the buck to protect your organization against real security threats. Within Critical Controls 2-4 are five “quick wins.” These are subcontrols that have the most immediate impact on preventing the advanced targeted attacks that have penetrated existing controls and compromised critical systems at thousands of organizations.

The five quick wins are:

- a) Application white listing (in CSC2)
- b) Using common, secure configurations (in CSC3)
- c) Patch application software within 48 hours (in CSC4)
- d) Patch systems software within 48 hours (CSC4)
- e) Reduce the number of users with administrative privileges (in CSC3 and CSC12)


## 6. Security Intelligence

The purpose of this section is to highlight intelligence gathered from the devices under contract as well as outside sources such honeypots, known malicious sources, vulnerability databases, relationships with CERT and CSIRT teams that GLESEC possesses, together with various other threat feeds.

The vast majority of attacks on METROBANK originated geographically from the following Top 10 countries: **United States, Panama, China, Argentina, Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Republic of Korea, France and Russian Federation** listed in order of frequency. The attacks that we observed are happening to companies all around the world.


### Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked

This report provides the count of total attacks blocked by country




### Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked by Attack Type

This report provides the count of total attacks types blocked by country




### Graph: Top 10 Attacking Countries Blocked by Protocol

This report provides the count of attack protocols blocked by country



## Graph: Attacks Types Blocked by Week

This report provides the count of attacks blocked by week




## Known Threat Source Information

Attacks on METROBANK are from known threat sources that have been compiled and correlated with attack source IPs gathered from the DefensePro attack logs and outside sources such honeypots, known malicious sources, vulnerability databases, relationships with CERT and CSIRT teams that GLESEC possesses, together with various other threat feeds.

Attacks on METROBANK from the DNS Blacklist obtained by correlating values from the Project Honey Pot Database.


## Graph: Known Threat Sources by Threat Type

This report provides the Top 20 known threat sources by IP and their respective infringing threat type.



## Graph: Attacks Denied

This report provides the count of total denied attacks along with network security rule.



## Port Information

**Port Information:** Port **80** (http), Port **1443** (ms-sql), Port **8080** (https-alt), Port **3306** (mysql)

Commonly scanned in order to attack web servers. SQL injection is currently the most common form of web site attack in that web forms are very common, often they are not coded properly and the hacking tools used to find weaknesses and take advantage of them are commonly available online. This kind of exploit is easy enough to accomplish that even inexperienced hackers can accomplish mischief. However, in the hands of the very skilled hacker, a web code weakness can reveal root level access of web servers and from there attacks on other networked servers can be accomplished. Structured Query Language (SQL) is the nearly universal language of databases that allows the storage, manipulation, and retrieval of data. Databases that use SQL include MS SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Access and Filemaker Pro and these databases are equally subject to SQL injection attack.

Web based forms must allow some access to your database to allow entry of data and a response, so this kind of attack bypasses firewalls and endpoint defenses. Any web form, even a simple logon form or search box, might provide access to your data by means of SQL injection if coded incorrectly.


OWASP Top 10 for 2013 lists A1-Injection as the greatest threat and defines this category as:

Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker's hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization.

A SQL injection attack consists of insertion or "injection" of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the application. A successful SQL injection exploit can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (Insert/Update/Delete), execute administration operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system. SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to effect the execution of predefined SQL commands.


## Graph: Attacks Blocked by Destination Port

This report provides information on the total number of attacks blocked that were attempted on which port and for how many times.




## Graph: Attacks Blocked By Threat Category

This report lists the attacks blocked per Attack Category, listing the attack name.




## Graph: Critical Attacks Blocked

This report provides Critical Attacks information, attack name, network security rule along with the number of times the attack was launched.




## Graph: Top Attacked Destinations Blocked

This report provides information on the system IPs, which were the destination of the attacks for most number of times along with the network security rule.




## Graph: Top Attacks Blocked

This report provides information on the Top Attacks Blocked, the attack name, network security rule and the total number of attacks blocked with this combination.




## Graph: Top Attacks Blocked by Destination

This report provides information on the top attacks targeted at destinations that were blocked on the DP IPS. In this report the destination on which the attack was targeted, attack name, and count are shown.




## Graph: Top Attacks Blocked By Risk

This report provides information on the attacks, which were blocked on DP IPS based on their risk. In this report the risk of the attack and attack name are shown.



## Graph: Top Attacks Blocked by Source


This report provides information on the top attacks blocked, categorized by attacks for each source that was the source of attacks along with the attack name and the number of attacks that triggered with this combination.



**NOTE:** See Appendix 1 – Critical Attack Sources (WHOIS Information)


## Graph: Top Destinations by Attacks Blocked

This report provides information on the attacks attempted for the most number of times on the destination protected system IPs.




Graph: Attacks Blocked by Network Security Rule

This report lists the attacks per network security rule, listing the attack name.



Graph: Attacks Blocked by Physical Port (per single IPS device)

This report lists the attacks per physical port.




Bandwidth Information

Behavioral-DoS dropped **60.97 Gbps**, Anti-scanning protection dropped **0.58 Gbps**, Access dropped **0.58 Gbps** of total traffic, **0.10 Gbps** dropped by Intrusion protection rules, Cracking protection dropped **0.01 Gbps**. A total of **62.25 Gbps** of malicious traffic was discarded this period.

|   | Category ↕                   | Gbps ↕ | Mbps ↕   |
|---|------------------------------|--------|----------|
| 1 | Behavioral-DoS               | 60.97  | 62432.38 |
| 2 | Anti-Scanning                | 0.58   | 598.09   |
| 3 | Access                       | 0.58   | 593.93   |
| 4 | Intrusions                   | 0.10   | 106.04   |
| 5 | Cracking-Protection          | 0.01   | 14.21    |
| 6 | Anomalies                    | 0.01   | 12.35    |
| 7 | Total Bandwidth in Gbps/Mbps | 62.25  | 63757.00 |


## Graph: Attack Categories Blocked by Bandwidth

This report shows the attack categories based on the BW of the attacks sharing the same category including Kbps.




## Graph: Bandwidth by Blocked Threat Category by Hour of Day

This report shows the most bandwidth consuming threat categories based on the bandwidth of the attacks sharing the same threat category for each hour of day.



## Graph: Top Attacks Blocked by Bandwidth

This report shows the most bandwidth consuming attacks based on the BW of the attack including Kbits.



## Scanning Information

Network-wide Anti Scanning protections dropped enumeration attempts which otherwise thwart any effort for threat modeling, commonplace after the information gathering phase of a targeted or planned attack.

We have included some of the most important ports scanned this period which tend to be exploited frequently by attackers. **Port Information:** Port **80** (http), Port **443** (http-alt)

Commonly scanned in order to attack web servers. SQL injection is currently the most common form of web site attack in that web forms are very common, often they are not coded properly and the hacking tools used to find weaknesses and take advantage of them are commonly available online. This kind of exploit is easy enough to accomplish that even inexperienced hackers can accomplish mischief. However, in the hands of the very skilled hacker, a web code weakness can reveal root level access of web servers and from there attacks on other networked servers can be accomplished. Structured Query Language (SQL) is the nearly universal language of databases that allows the storage, manipulation, and retrieval of data. Databases that use SQL include MS SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Access and Filemaker Pro and these databases are equally subject to SQL injection attack.

Web based forms must allow some access to your database to allow entry of data and a response, so this kind of attack bypasses firewalls and endpoint defenses. Any web form, even a simple logon form or search box, might provide access to your data by means of SQL injection if coded incorrectly.

**Port Information:** Port **1433** (ms-sql-s), **3306** (mysql)

OWASP Top 10 for 2013 lists A1-Injection as the greatest threat and defines this category as:

Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker's hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization.

A SQL injection attack consists of insertion or "injection" of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the application. A successful SQL injection exploit can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (Insert/Update/Delete), execute administration

operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system. SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to effect the execution of predefined SQL commands.

**Port Information:** Port **23** (telnet), **22** (ssh)


This port is commonly bruteforced for default administrative accounts which usually provide access to network and communications equipment.

**Port Information:** Port **5060** (sip)

The default gateway commonly associated with the SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) is the system port 5060. This communication portal supports the signaling protocol which is widely deployed for setting up (including tearing down) of sessions involving multimedia communication like video calls, voice calls and even VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). Threat actors commonly seek out these servers to commandeer the service in order to make free calls to countries of their choice or use them to carry out phone scams.


**Graph: Top Probed Applications Blocked**

This report shows historical view of the Top probed L4 ports.




**Graph: Top Probed IP Addresses Blocked**

This report shows historical view of the Top probed IP addresses that were being scanned along with the network security rule.



### Graph: Top Scanners Blocked (Source IP Addressed)

This report shows historical view of the Top source IP addresses that have scanned the network by network scanning activities along with the network security rule.



**[NOTE: See Appendix 2 – Top Scanners Blocked \(Source IP Addressed\)](#)**

## Vulnerability Management

It is important to establish a vulnerability management program as part of the information security strategy because soon after new vulnerabilities are discovered and reported by security researchers or vendors, attackers engineer exploit code and then launch that code against targets of interest. Any significant delays in finding or fixing software with dangerous vulnerabilities provides ample opportunity for persistent attackers to break through, gaining control over the vulnerable machines and getting access to the sensitive data they contain. Organizations that do not scan for vulnerabilities and proactively address discovered flaws face a significant likelihood of having their systems compromised.

The GLESEC AVDS Management System platform performs a security mapping of your organization network, runs tests on everything that speaks IP, and accurately evaluates the presence of vulnerabilities.

Many of the vulnerabilities will provide CVE data. CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) is a list of information security exposures and vulnerabilities sponsored by US-CERT and maintained by the MITRE Corporation. The CVE mission is to

provide standard names for all publicly known security exposures as well as standard definitions for security terms. The CVE can be searched online at <http://nvd.nist.gov/>.

## Vulnerability Score

The score of a vulnerability is determined by its risk factor; High, Medium or Low, as well as its value in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS “base score” represents the innate risk characteristic of each vulnerability. CVSS is a vulnerability scoring system designed to provide an open and standardized method for rating IT vulnerabilities. CVSS helps organizations prioritize and coordinate a joint response to security vulnerabilities by communicating the base, temporal and environmental properties of each vulnerability. In addition to numeric scores, the CVSS provides severity rankings of High, Medium, and Low but these qualitative rankings are simply mapped from the numeric CVSS scores.

Vulnerabilities are labelled as:

- a) Low risk if they have a CVSS base score of 0.0 – 3.9
- b) Medium risk if they have a CVSS base score of 4.0 – 6.9
- c) High risk if they have a CVSS base score of 7.0 – 10.0

Vulnerabilities in the report are classified into 3 risk categories: high, medium or low.

### High Risk

Describes vulnerabilities that can allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges, remote command execution, full read/write access, or critical information disclosure (e.g. passwords, hashes) on a vulnerable machine and should be addressed as top priority.

### Medium Risk

Describes vulnerabilities that either expose sensitive data, directory browsing and traversal, disclosure of security controls, facilitate unauthorized use of services or denial of service to an attacker.

### Low Risk


Describes vulnerabilities that allow preliminary or sensitive information gathering for an attacker or pose risks that are not entirely security related but maybe used in social-engineering or similar attacks.

## Vulnerability Information

We can observe that Intrusions (known attack signatures), HTTP Flood and Web Scanning attempts are targeting Web Servers and are being dropped by the DefensePro. We cannot be 100% sure but there is a high probability that this type of attack is occurring and if the DefensePro was not in place, the attack might have been successfully carried out. The same is true for Mail servers which are frequently being scanned (Web Scanning).


### Graph: Risk Distribution

This report depicts the risk distribution of vulnerabilities discovered this report period




### Graph: Most Frequent Vulnerability Category

This report depicts the most frequent vulnerabilities by category discovered this report period




### Graph: Most Frequent Vulnerability Name

This report depicts the most frequent vulnerabilities discovered this report period




### Graph: Most Vulnerable Host

This report depicts the most vulnerable hosts discovered this report period




### Graph: Vulnerability Risk by Vulnerability Name

This report illustrates the vulnerability risk and count by vulnerability name discovered this report period




### Graph: Vulnerability Risk by Host

This report illustrates the vulnerability risk and count by category discovered this report period




### Graph: Vulnerability Risk by Category

This report illustrates the vulnerability risk and count by category discovered this report period




## Graph: Vulnerability Category by Vulnerability Name

This report illustrates the vulnerability category and count by vulnerability name discovered this report period




## Graph: Vulnerability Category by Host

This report illustrates the vulnerability category and count by host discovered this report period




## Graph: Vulnerability Category by Risk

This report illustrates the vulnerability category and count by risk discovered this report period




## Graph: Host by Vulnerability Name

This report illustrates the vulnerability name and count by hosts discovered this report period




## Graph: Host by Vulnerability Category

This report illustrates the vulnerability category and count by hosts discovered this report period



## Graph: Host by Vulnerability Risk

This report illustrates the vulnerability risk and count by hosts discovered this report period





## 7. Security Operations


The purpose of this section is to highlight the activities performed by GLESEC's Global Operations Center (GOC) including: monitoring availability and performance of equipment under contract, Change Management and Incident Response activities.

### a) Monitoring System Availability

**METROBANK** Appwall Availability:

The Appwall was considered up and available **100 %** during this report period.

Host State Breakdowns:



| State        | Type / Reason      | Time         | % Total Time | % Known Time |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| UP           | Unscheduled        | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |
| DOWN         | Unscheduled        | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
| UNREACHABLE  | Unscheduled        | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
| Undetermined | Nagios Not Running | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
|              | Insufficient Data  | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
| All          | Total              | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |


State Breakdowns For Host Services:

| Service | % Time OK         | % Time Warning  | % Time Unknown  | % Time Critical | % Time Undetermined |
|---------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| PING    | 99.989% (99.989%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.011% (0.011%) | 0.000%              |
| Average | 99.989% (99.989%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.011% (0.011%) | 0.000%              |

## METROBANK DefensePro Availability:

The DefensePro was considered up and available **100 %** during this report period.

### Host State Breakdowns:



| State        | Type / Reason      | Time         | % Total Time | % Known Time |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| UP           | Unscheduled        | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |
| DOWN         | Unscheduled        | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
| UNREACHABLE  | Unscheduled        | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Scheduled          | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       | 0.000%       |
| Undetermined | Nagios Not Running | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
|              | Insufficient Data  | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
|              | Total              | 0d 0h 0m 0s  | 0.000%       |              |
| All          | Total              | 31d 0h 0m 0s | 100.000%     | 100.000%     |


### State Breakdowns For Host Services:

| Service | % Time OK         | % Time Warning  | % Time Unknown  | % Time Critical | % Time Undetermined |
|---------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| PING    | 99.978% (99.978%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.022% (0.022%) | 0.000%              |
| Average | 99.978% (99.978%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.000% (0.000%) | 0.022% (0.022%) | 0.000%              |

## b) Monitoring system performance

### METROBANK Appwall Host Performance

Round trip ping times averaged **86.94** ms from the GLESEC GOC to **METROBANK** with **0** % average packet loss.




## METROBANK DefensePro Host Performance

Round trip ping times averaged **85.41** ms from the GLESEC GOC to **METROBANK** with **0** % average packet loss.


Host: MetroBank DefensePro 506 Service: Host Perfdata

Custom time range 01.08.16 0:00 - 01.09.16 0:00

Datasource: Round Trip Times



Datasource: Packets Lost



**c) Change Management Procedures**

**No change management activity during the month of August 2016**

**d) Incident Response Procedures**

**No incident Response activity during the month of August 2016**

## **8. Appendix 1 – Critical Attack Sources (WHOIS Information)**

This section provides additional WHOIS detail for the Graph: Critical Attacks

**NetRange: 23.24.0.0 - 23.25.255.255**

CIDR: 23.24.0.0/15

NetName: CBC-ALLOC-4

NetHandle: NET-23-24-0-0-1

Parent: NET23 (NET-23-0-0-0-0)

NetType: Direct Allocation

OriginAS:

Organization: Comcast Business Communications, LLC (CBCI)

RegDate: 2012-01-13

Updated: 2012-02-23

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-23-24-0-0-1>

OrgName: Comcast Business Communications, LLC

OrgId: CBCI

Address: 1800 Bishops Gate Blvd.

City: Mount Laurel

StateProv: NJ

PostalCode: 08054-4628

Country: US

RegDate: 2001-12-21

Updated: 2011-01-06

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/CBCI>

OrgAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance

OrgAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329

OrgAbuseEmail:

OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: IC161-ARIN

OrgTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc

OrgTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200

OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN  
RAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance  
RAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329  
RAbuseEmail:  
RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IC161-ARIN  
RTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc  
RTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200  
RTechEmail:  
RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

NetRange: 23.24.160.0 - 23.24.191.255  
CIDR: 23.24.160.0/19  
NetName: CBC-MIAMI-25  
NetHandle: NET-23-24-160-0-1  
Parent: CBC-ALLOC-4 (NET-23-24-0-0-1)  
NetType: Reallocated  
OriginAS:  
Organization: Comcast Business Communications, LLC (CBCI)  
RegDate: 2012-02-24  
Updated: 2012-02-24  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-23-24-160-0-1>

OrgName: Comcast Business Communications, LLC  
OrgId: CBCI  
Address: 1800 Bishops Gate Blvd.  
City: Mount Laurel  
StateProv: NJ  
PostalCode: 08054-4628  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2001-12-21  
Updated: 2011-01-06  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/CBCI>

OrgAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: IC161-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc  
OrgTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

**NetRange: 65.5.139.96 - 65.5.139.127**

CIDR: 65.5.139.96/27  
NetName: BLS-65-5-139-96-27-1007264407  
NetHandle: NET-65-5-139-96-1  
Parent: BELLSNET-BLK9 (NET-65-0-0-0-1)  
NetType: Reassigned  
OriginAS:  
Customer: Datapro (C02554356)  
RegDate: 2010-07-26  
Updated: 2010-07-26  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-65-5-139-96-1>

CustName: Datapro  
Address: 770 Ponce De Leon  
City: Coral Gables  
StateProv: FL  
PostalCode: 33131  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2010-07-26  
Updated: 2011-03-19  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C02554356>

OrgTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
OrgTechName: IP Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Group  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
RTechName: IP Operations  
RTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
RTechEmail:  
RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
RAbuseName: Abuse Group  
RAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
RAbuseEmail:  
RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

NetRange: 65.0.0.0 - 65.15.255.255  
CIDR: 65.0.0.0/12  
NetName: BELLSNET-BLK9  
NetHandle: NET-65-0-0-0-1  
Parent: NET65 (NET-65-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS6389  
Organization: BellSouth.net Inc. (BELL)  
RegDate: 2003-12-29  
Updated: 2013-08-09  
Comment: For Abuse Issues, email .  
Comment: Law Enforcement legal requests for records should be directed to - AT&T Internet Services, 1010 North Saint Marys Street, Room 315-A2, San Antonio, Texas 78215,

Phone: 210-351-3216, Fax: 707-435-6409

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-65-0-0-0-1>

OrgName: BellSouth.net Inc.

OrgId: BELL

Address: 575 Morosgo Drive

City: Atlanta

StateProv: GA

PostalCode: 30324

Country: US

RegDate: 1995-03-02

Updated: 2014-07-23

Comment: For Abuse Issues, email .

Comment: Law Enforcement legal requests for records should be directed to - AT&T Internet Services, 1010 North Saint Marys Street, Room 315-A2, San Antonio, Texas 78215, Phone: 210-351-3216, Fax: 707-435-6409

Comment:

Comment: [rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net](http://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net) 4321

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/BELL>

ReferralServer: [rwhois://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net](http://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net):4321

OrgTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN

OrgTechName: IP Operations

OrgTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545

OrgTechEmail:

OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Abuse Group

OrgAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265

OrgAbuseEmail:

OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN

RTechName: IP Operations

RTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545

RTechEmail:

RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN

RAbuseName: Abuse Group

RAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265

RAbuseEmail:

RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

**NetRange: 54.240.0.0 - 54.255.255.255**

CIDR: 54.240.0.0/12

NetName: AMAZON-2011L

NetHandle: NET-54-240-0-0-1

Parent: NET54 (NET-54-0-0-0-0)

NetType: Direct Allocation

OriginAS: AS16509

Organization: Amazon Technologies Inc. (AT-88-Z)

RegDate: 2011-12-09

Updated: 2012-04-02

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-54-240-0-0-1>

OrgName: Amazon Technologies Inc.

OrgId: AT-88-Z

Address: 410 Terry Ave N.

City: Seattle

StateProv: WA

PostalCode: 98109

Country: US

RegDate: 2011-12-08

Updated: 2014-10-20

Comment: All abuse reports MUST include:

Comment: \* src IP

Comment: \* dest IP (your IP)

Comment: \* dest port

Comment: \* Accurate date/timestamp and timezone of activity

Comment: \* Intensity/frequency (short log extracts)  
Comment: \* Your contact details (phone and email) Without these we will be unable to identify the correct owner of the IP address at that point in time.  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/AT-88-Z>

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ANO24-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AEA8-ARIN>

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN  
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations  
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-2187  
OrgNOCEmail:  
OrgNOCRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AANO1-ARIN>

NetRange: 54.244.0.0 - 54.244.255.255  
CIDR: 54.244.0.0/16  
NetName: AMAZO-ZPDX2  
NetHandle: NET-54-244-0-0-1  
Parent: AMAZON-2011L (NET-54-240-0-0-1)  
NetType: Reallocated  
OriginAS: AS16509  
Organization: Amazon.com, Inc. (AMAZO-47)  
RegDate: 2012-12-27  
Updated: 2012-12-27  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-54-244-0-0-1>

OrgName: Amazon.com, Inc.  
OrgId: AMAZO-47

Address: EC2, EC2 1200 12th Ave South  
City: Seattle  
StateProv: WA  
PostalCode: 98144  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2011-05-10  
Updated: 2014-10-17  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/AMAZO-47>

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AEA8-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ANO24-ARIN>

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN  
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations  
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-2187  
OrgNOCEmail:  
OrgNOCRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AANO1-ARIN>

**inetnum: 181.24/14**

status: allocated  
aut-num: N/A  
owner: Telefonica de Argentina  
ownerid: AR-TEAR7-LACNIC  
responsible: José Luis Pérez Elias  
address: AV. ING. HUERGO, 723, GERENCIA DE REQUERIMIENTOS JUDICIALES  
address: 1065 - Buenos Aires - CF  
country: AR

phone: +54 8102220102 []  
owner-c: TEA  
tech-c: TEA  
abuse-c: TEA  
inetrev: 181.24/14  
nserver: DNS1.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS2.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS3.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS4.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
created: 20130102  
changed: 20130102

nic-hdl: TEA  
person: Telefonica de Argentina  
e-mail:  
address: AV. ING. HUERGO, 723,  
address: 1065 - Capital Federal - BA  
country: AR  
phone: +54 11 43335000 []  
created: 20030618  
changed: 20110603

**inetnum: 201.227.61/24**  
status: reallocated  
owner: Cable & Wireless Panama  
ownerid: PA-CWPA1-LACNIC  
responsible: Networks Operations  
address: Via España, Torre Bco. Nacional, 1,

address: 083400659 - Panama -  
country: PA  
phone: +507 269 6181 []  
owner-c: CAP3  
tech-c: CAP3  
abuse-c: CAP3  
created: 20060724  
changed: 20060724  
inetnum-up: 201.227/16

nic-hdl: CAP3  
person: Russell Bean  
e-mail:  
address: Apartado 659, PA,  
address: 9A - Panama -  
country: PA  
phone: +507 882 2200 [22]  
created: 20030416  
changed: 20130509

**NetRange: 199.168.136.0 - 199.168.143.255**

CIDR: 199.168.136.0/21  
NetName: VOLUMEDRIVE  
NetHandle: NET-199-168-136-0-1  
Parent: NET199 (NET-199-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS46664  
Organization: VolumeDrive (VOLUM-2)  
RegDate: 2011-06-17  
Updated: 2012-03-02  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-199-168-136-0-1>

OrgName: VolumeDrive  
OrgId: VOLUM-2  
Address: 1143 Northern Blvd

City: Clarks Summit  
StateProv: PA  
PostalCode: 18411  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2008-08-26  
Updated: 2011-09-24  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/VOLUM-2>

OrgAbuseHandle: VOLUM1-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: VolumeDrive POC  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-862-266-1083  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/VOLUM1-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: VOLUM1-ARIN  
OrgTechName: VolumeDrive POC  
OrgTechPhone: +1-862-266-1083  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/VOLUM1-ARIN>

**NetRange: 71.6.135.0 - 71.6.135.255**

CIDR: 71.6.135.0/24  
NetName: NET-24  
NetHandle: NET-71-6-135-0-1  
Parent: CARINET-5 (NET-71-6-128-0-1)  
NetType: Reassigned  
OriginAS: AS10439  
Customer: CariNet, Inc. (C04837931)  
RegDate: 2014-01-03  
Updated: 2014-01-03  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-71-6-135-0-1>

CustName: CariNet, Inc.  
Address: 8929 Complex Drive  
City: San Diego

StateProv: CA  
PostalCode: 92123  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2014-01-03  
Updated: 2014-01-03  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C04837931>

OrgTechHandle: CARIN-ARIN  
OrgTechName: CariNet Networking  
OrgTechPhone: +1-858-974-5080  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/CARIN-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE341-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: CariNet Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-858-974-5080  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE341-ARIN>

NetRange: 71.6.128.0 - 71.6.255.255  
CIDR: 71.6.128.0/17  
NetName: CARINET-5  
NetHandle: NET-71-6-128-0-1  
Parent: NET71 (NET-71-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS10439  
Organization: CariNet, Inc. (CARIN-6)  
RegDate: 2006-02-01  
Updated: 2012-03-02  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-71-6-128-0-1>

OrgName: CariNet, Inc.  
OrgId: CARIN-6  
Address: 8929 COMPLEX DR  
City: SAN DIEGO

StateProv: CA  
PostalCode: 92123  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2009-11-17  
Updated: 2014-01-06  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/CARIN-6>

OrgTechHandle: CARIN-ARIN  
OrgTechName: CariNet Networking  
OrgTechPhone: +1-858-974-5080  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/CARIN-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE341-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: CariNet Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-858-974-5080  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE341-ARIN>

## 9. Appendix 2 – Top Scanners Blocked (WHOIS Information)

This section provides additional WHOIS detail for the Graph: Top Scanners Blocked (Source IP Addressed)

**NetRange: 23.24.0.0 - 23.25.255.255**

CIDR: 23.24.0.0/15

NetName: CBC-ALLOC-4

NetHandle: NET-23-24-0-0-1

Parent: NET23 (NET-23-0-0-0-0)

NetType: Direct Allocation

OriginAS:

Organization: Comcast Business Communications, LLC (CBCI)

RegDate: 2012-01-13

Updated: 2012-02-23

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-23-24-0-0-1>

OrgName: Comcast Business Communications, LLC

OrgId: CBCI

Address: 1800 Bishops Gate Blvd.

City: Mount Laurel

StateProv: NJ

PostalCode: 08054-4628

Country: US

RegDate: 2001-12-21

Updated: 2011-01-06

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/CBCI>

OrgAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance

OrgAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329

OrgAbuseEmail:

OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: IC161-ARIN

OrgTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc

OrgTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN  
RAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance  
RAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329  
RAbuseEmail:  
RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IC161-ARIN  
RTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc  
RTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200  
RTechEmail:  
RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

NetRange: 23.24.160.0 - 23.24.191.255  
CIDR: 23.24.160.0/19  
NetName: CBC-MIAMI-25  
NetHandle: NET-23-24-160-0-1  
Parent: CBC-ALLOC-4 (NET-23-24-0-0-1)  
NetType: Reallocated  
OriginAS:  
Organization: Comcast Business Communications, LLC (CBCI)  
RegDate: 2012-02-24  
Updated: 2012-02-24  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-23-24-160-0-1>

OrgName: Comcast Business Communications, LLC  
OrgId: CBCI  
Address: 1800 Bishops Gate Blvd.  
City: Mount Laurel  
StateProv: NJ  
PostalCode: 08054-4628  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2001-12-21  
Updated: 2011-01-06

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/CBCI>

OrgAbuseHandle: NAPO-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse and Policy Observance

OrgAbusePhone: +1-888-565-4329

OrgAbuseEmail:

OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAPO-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: IC161-ARIN

OrgTechName: Comcast Cable Communications Inc

OrgTechPhone: +1-856-317-7200

OrgTechEmail:

OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IC161-ARIN>

**NetRange: 65.5.139.96 - 65.5.139.127**

CIDR: 65.5.139.96/27

NetName: BLS-65-5-139-96-27-1007264407

NetHandle: NET-65-5-139-96-1

Parent: BELLSNET-BLK9 (NET-65-0-0-0-1)

NetType: Reassigned

OriginAS:

Customer: Datapro (C02554356)

RegDate: 2010-07-26

Updated: 2010-07-26

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-65-5-139-96-1>

CustName: Datapro

Address: 770 Ponce De Leon

City: Coral Gables

StateProv: FL

PostalCode: 33131

Country: US

RegDate: 2010-07-26

Updated: 2011-03-19

Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C02554356>

OrgTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
OrgTechName: IP Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Group  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
RTechName: IP Operations  
RTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
RTechEmail:  
RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
RAbuseName: Abuse Group  
RAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
RAbuseEmail:  
RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

NetRange: 65.0.0.0 - 65.15.255.255  
CIDR: 65.0.0.0/12  
NetName: BELLSNET-BLK9  
NetHandle: NET-65-0-0-0-1  
Parent: NET65 (NET-65-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS6389  
Organization: BellSouth.net Inc. (BELL)  
RegDate: 2003-12-29  
Updated: 2013-08-09  
Comment: For Abuse Issues, email .  
Comment: Law Enforcement legal requests for records should be directed to - AT&T

Internet Services, 1010 North Saint Marys Street, Room 315-A2, San Antonio, Texas 78215,  
Phone: 210-351-3216, Fax: 707-435-6409  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-65-0-0-0-1>

OrgName: BellSouth.net Inc.  
OrgId: BELL  
Address: 575 Morosgo Drive  
City: Atlanta  
StateProv: GA  
PostalCode: 30324  
Country: US  
RegDate: 1995-03-02  
Updated: 2014-07-23  
Comment: For Abuse Issues, email .  
Comment: Law Enforcement legal requests for records should be directed to - AT&T  
Internet Services, 1010 North Saint Marys Street, Room 315-A2, San Antonio, Texas 78215,  
Phone: 210-351-3216, Fax: 707-435-6409  
Comment:  
Comment: [rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net](http://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net) 4321  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/BELL>

ReferralServer: [rwhois://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net:4321](http://rwhois.eng.bellsouth.net:4321)

OrgTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
OrgTechName: IP Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Group  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

RTechHandle: IPOPE3-ARIN  
RTechName: IP Operations

RTechPhone: +1-888-510-5545  
RTechEmail:  
RTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPOPE3-ARIN>

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE81-ARIN  
RAbuseName: Abuse Group  
RAbusePhone: +1-919-319-8265  
RAbuseEmail:  
RAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE81-ARIN>

**NetRange: 54.240.0.0 - 54.255.255.255**

CIDR: 54.240.0.0/12  
NetName: AMAZON-2011L  
NetHandle: NET-54-240-0-0-1  
Parent: NET54 (NET-54-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS16509  
Organization: Amazon Technologies Inc. (AT-88-Z)  
RegDate: 2011-12-09  
Updated: 2012-04-02  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-54-240-0-0-1>

OrgName: Amazon Technologies Inc.  
OrgId: AT-88-Z  
Address: 410 Terry Ave N.  
City: Seattle  
StateProv: WA  
PostalCode: 98109  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2011-12-08  
Updated: 2014-10-20  
Comment: All abuse reports MUST include:  
Comment: \* src IP  
Comment: \* dest IP (your IP)  
Comment: \* dest port

Comment: \* Accurate date/timestamp and timezone of activity  
Comment: \* Intensity/frequency (short log extracts)  
Comment: \* Your contact details (phone and email) Without these we will be unable to identify the correct owner of the IP address at that point in time.  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/AT-88-Z>

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ANO24-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AEA8-ARIN>

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN  
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations  
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-2187  
OrgNOCEmail:  
OrgNOCRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AANO1-ARIN>

NetRange: 54.244.0.0 - 54.244.255.255  
CIDR: 54.244.0.0/16  
NetName: AMAZO-ZPDX2  
NetHandle: NET-54-244-0-0-1  
Parent: AMAZON-2011L (NET-54-240-0-0-1)  
NetType: Reallocated  
OriginAS: AS16509  
Organization: Amazon.com, Inc. (AMAZO-47)  
RegDate: 2012-12-27  
Updated: 2012-12-27  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-54-244-0-0-1>

OrgName: Amazon.com, Inc.

OrgId: AMAZO-47  
Address: EC2, EC2 1200 12th Ave South  
City: Seattle  
StateProv: WA  
PostalCode: 98144  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2011-05-10  
Updated: 2014-10-17  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/AMAZO-47>

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AEA8-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN  
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ANO24-ARIN>

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN  
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations  
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-2187  
OrgNOCEmail:  
OrgNOCRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/AANO1-ARIN>

**inetnum: 181.24/14**

status: allocated  
aut-num: N/A  
owner: Telefonica de Argentina  
ownerid: AR-TEAR7-LACNIC  
responsible: José Luis Pérez Elias  
address: AV. ING. HUERGO, 723, GERENCIA DE REQUERIMIENTOS JUDICIALES  
address: 1065 - Buenos Aires - CF

country: AR  
phone: +54 8102220102 []  
owner-c: TEA  
tech-c: TEA  
abuse-c: TEA  
inetrev: 181.24/14  
nserver: DNS1.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS2.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS3.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
nserver: DNS4.MRSE.COM.AR  
nsstat: 20150907 AA  
nslastaa: 20150907  
created: 20130102  
changed: 20130102

nic-hdl: TEA  
person: Telefonica de Argentina  
e-mail:  
address: AV. ING. HUERGO, 723,  
address: 1065 - Capital Federal - BA  
country: AR  
phone: +54 11 43335000 []  
created: 20030618  
changed: 20110603

**NetRange: 199.168.136.0 - 199.168.143.255**

CIDR: 199.168.136.0/21

NetName: VOLUMEDRIVE

NetHandle: NET-199-168-136-0-1

Parent: NET199 (NET-199-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS46664  
Organization: VolumeDrive (VOLUM-2)  
RegDate: 2011-06-17  
Updated: 2012-03-02  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-199-168-136-0-1>

OrgName: VolumeDrive  
OrgId: VOLUM-2  
Address: 1143 Northern Blvd  
City: Clarks Summit  
StateProv: PA  
PostalCode: 18411  
Country: US  
RegDate: 2008-08-26  
Updated: 2011-09-24  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/VOLUM-2>

OrgAbuseHandle: VOLUM1-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: VolumeDrive POC  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-862-266-1083  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/VOLUM1-ARIN>

OrgTechHandle: VOLUM1-ARIN  
OrgTechName: VolumeDrive POC  
OrgTechPhone: +1-862-266-1083  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/VOLUM1-ARIN>

**inetnum: 222.32.0.0 - 222.63.255.255**  
netname: CTTNET  
descr: China TieTong Telecommunications Corporation  
descr: Jinze Mansion, 2 Guangningbo Street,  
descr: Xicheng District, Beijing, China, 100032  
country: CN  
admin-c: WP188-AP  
tech-c: LM273-AP  
status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE  
mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP  
mnt-lower: MAINT-CN-CRTC  
mnt-routes: MAINT-CNNIC-AP  
mnt-irt: IRT-CNNIC-CN  
changed: 20090430  
source: APNIC

irt: IRT-CNNIC-CN  
address: Beijing, China  
e-mail:  
abuse-mailbox:  
admin-c: IP50-AP  
tech-c: IP50-AP  
auth: # Filtered  
remarks: Please note that CNNIC is not an ISP and is not  
remarks: empowered to investigate complaints of network abuse.  
remarks: Please contact the tech-c or admin-c of the network.  
mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP  
changed: 20110428  
source: APNIC

person: liu min  
nic-hdl: LM273-AP  
e-mail:  
address: 22F Yuetan Mansion, Xicheng District, Beijing, P.R.China  
phone: +86-10-51848796  
fax-no: +86-10-51842426

country: CN  
changed: 20120320  
mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP  
source: APNIC

person: Wang Pei  
nic-hdl: WP188-AP  
e-mail:  
address: Jinze Mansion, 2 Guangningbo Street,  
address: Xicheng District, Beijing, China, 100032  
phone: +21-51892106  
fax-no: +21-51847802  
country: CN  
changed: 20060926  
mnt-by: MAINT-CNNIC-AP  
source: APNIC

**NetRange: 45.34.0.0 - 45.35.255.255**

CIDR: 45.34.0.0/15  
NetName: PSYCHZ-NETWORKS  
NetHandle: NET-45-34-0-0-1  
Parent: NET45 (NET-45-0-0-0-0)  
NetType: Direct Allocation  
OriginAS: AS40676  
Organization: Psychz Networks (PS-184)  
RegDate: 2015-03-03  
Updated: 2015-03-03  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-45-34-0-0-1>

OrgName: Psychz Networks  
OrgId: PS-184  
Address: 20687-2 Amar Road #312  
City: Walnut  
StateProv: CA  
PostalCode: 91789

Country: US  
RegDate: 2013-04-17  
Updated: 2013-09-05  
Ref: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/org/PS-184>

ReferralServer: [rwhois://rwhois.psychz.net:4321](http://rwhois.rwhois.psychz.net:4321)

OrgTechHandle: NOC3077-ARIN  
OrgTechName: NOC  
OrgTechPhone: +1-626-549-2801  
OrgTechEmail:  
OrgTechRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NOC3077-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: NOC3077-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: NOC  
OrgAbusePhone: +1-626-549-2801  
OrgAbuseEmail:  
OrgAbuseRef: <http://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NOC3077-ARIN>

== Additional Information From [rwhois://rwhois.psychz.net:4321](http://rwhois.rwhois.psychz.net:4321) ==

%rwhois V-1.0,V-1.5:00090h:00 portal.psychz.net (Ubersmith RWhois Server V-2.4.0)

autharea=45.34.1.0/24

xautharea=45.34.1.0/24

network:Class-Name:network

network:Auth-Area:45.34.1.0/24

network:ID:NET-42125.45.34.1.128/25

network:Network-Name:45.34.1.128/25

network:IP-Network:45.34.1.128/25

network:IP-Network-Block:45.34.1.128 - 45.34.1.255

network:Org-Name:meiyunla

network:Street-Address:guangdongshengshenzhenshinanshanqu

network:City:shenzhen

network:State:china

network:Postal-Code:

network:Country-Code:CN

network:Tech-Contact:MAINT-42125.45.34.1.128/25

network:Created:20150711084145000  
network:Updated:20150711084145000  
network:Updated-By:  
contact:POC-Name:Network Administrator  
contact:POC-Email:  
contact:POC-Phone:  
contact:Tech-Name:Network Administrator  
contact:Tech-Email:  
contact:Tech-Phone:  
%ok

**inetnum: 46.234.125.0 - 46.234.125.255**

netname: SUPERNETWORK-HOUSING-C125  
descr: SuperNetwork s.r.o.  
descr: Server housing shared subnet  
country: CZ  
admin-c: ZC10-RIPE  
tech-c: SUPN1-RIPE  
status: ASSIGNED PA  
mnt-by: SUPERNETWORK-MNT  
changed: 20120321  
created: 2012-03-15T13:13:22Z  
last-modified: 2012-03-21T13:08:31Z  
source: RIPE  
remarks: INFRA-AW

role: SuperNetwork s.r.o. technical staff  
address: SuperNetwork s.r.o.  
address: Bilejova 407  
address: 46303 Liberec  
address: Czech republic  
e-mail:  
admin-c: ZC10-RIPE  
admin-c: JP4750-RIPE  
tech-c: ZC10-RIPE

tech-c: JP4750-RIPE  
nic-hdl: SUPN1-RIPE  
mnt-by: SUPERNETWORK-MNT  
changed: 20140905  
created: 2006-09-01T14:29:48Z  
last-modified: 2014-09-05T11:25:17Z  
source: RIPE  
abuse-mailbox:

person: Zdenek Cendra  
address: Na Safrance 33  
address: Praha 10  
address: 101 00  
address: Czech Republic  
abuse-mailbox:  
e-mail:

phone: +420296826296  
notify:  
nic-hdl: ZC10-RIPE  
changed: 20100531  
mnt-by: SUPERNETWORK-MNT  
created: 2002-08-16T11:56:13Z  
last-modified: 2014-07-23T12:15:08Z  
source: RIPE

route: 46.234.112.0/20  
descr: SuperNetwork s.r.o.  
origin: AS39392  
mnt-by: SUPERNETWORK-MNT  
created: 2011-02-25T14:52:43Z  
last-modified: 2011-02-25T14:52:43Z  
source: RIPE  
changed: 20110225

**inetnum: 186.150/16**

status: allocated

aut-num: N/A

owner: TRICOM

ownerid: DO-TRIC-LACNIC

responsible: Nicolas Mattle

address: Avenida Lopez de Vega, 95, Piantini

address: 025273 - Santo Domingo - DN

country: DO

phone: +1 809 4764141 []

owner-c: WAP2

tech-c: WAP2

abuse-c: WAP2

inetrev: 186.150/16

nserver: NS1.TRICOM.NET

nsstat: 20150908 AA

nslastaa: 20150908

nserver: NS2.TRICOM.NET

nsstat: 20150908 AA

nslastaa: 20150908

nserver: NS3.TRICOM.NET

nsstat: 20150908 AA

nslastaa: 20150908

nserver: NS4.TRICOM.NET

nsstat: 20150908 AA

nslastaa: 20150908

created: 20130603

changed: 20130603

nic-hdl: WAP2

person: Layi Felix

e-mail:

address: Ave. Nunez de Caceres, Torre Orange, 8, Sto. Dgo.

address: - Santo Domingo - RD

country: DO

phone: +1 809 8451283 [1283]

created: 20040430  
changed: 20150527

**inetnum: 80.82.65.0 - 80.82.65.255**

netname: NL-ECATEL  
descr: AS29073, Ecatel LTD  
country: NL  
admin-c: EL25-RIPE  
tech-c: EL25-RIPE  
status: ASSIGNED PA  
mnt-by: ECATEL-MNT  
mnt-lower: ECATEL-MNT  
mnt-routes: ECATEL-MNT  
changed: 20100930  
created: 2010-09-30T19:51:08Z  
last-modified: 2010-09-30T19:51:08Z  
source: RIPE

role: Ecatel LTD  
address: P.O.Box 19533  
address: 2521 CA The Hague  
address: Netherlands  
abuse-mailbox:  
remarks: -----  
remarks: ECATEL LTD  
remarks: Dedicated and Co-location hosting services  
remarks: -----  
remarks: for abuse complaints :  
remarks: for any other questions :  
remarks: -----  
e-mail:  
admin-c: EL25-RIPE  
tech-c: EL25-RIPE  
nic-hdl: EL25-RIPE  
mnt-by: ECATEL-MNT

changed: 20130201  
created: 2006-07-14T17:18:00Z  
last-modified: 2013-02-01T00:20:54Z  
source: RIPE

route: 80.82.65.0/24  
descr: AS29073 Route object  
origin: AS29073  
mnt-by: ECATEL-MNT  
changed: 20100930  
created: 2010-09-30T19:52:43Z  
last-modified: 2010-09-30T19:52:43Z  
source: RIPE

## **10. Appendix 3 – Glossary of Terms**

### **Amplification Attack**

An Amplification Attack is any attack where an attacker is able to use an amplification factor to multiply its power. Amplification attacks are “asymmetric”, meaning that a relatively small number or low level of resources is required by an attacker to cause a significantly greater number or higher level of target resources to malfunction or fail. Examples of amplification attacks include Smurf Attacks (ICMP amplification), Fraggle Attacks (UDP amplification), and DNS Amplification.

### **Botnet**

A botnet is a collection of compromised computers often referred to as “zombies” infected with malware that allows an attacker to control them. Botnet owners or “herders” are able to control the machines in their botnet by means of a covert channel such as IRC (Internet Relay Chat), issuing commands to perform malicious activities such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, the sending of spam mail, and information theft. As of 2006, the average size of any given botnet around the world was around 20,000 machines (as botnet owners attempted to scale down their networks to avoid detection), although some larger more advanced botnets such as Bredolab, Conficker, TDL-4, and Zeus have been estimated to contain millions of machines.

### **Computer Emergency Readiness Team Computer Emergency Response Team Computer Security Incident Response Team**

Computer Emergency Response Team is a name given to expert groups that handle computer security incidents. Most groups append the abbreviation CERT or CSIRT to their designation where the latter stands for Computer Security Incident Response Team.

### **DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) Attack**

DDoS or Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks are a variant of Denial-of-Service DoS attacks where an attacker or a group of attackers employ multiple machines to carry out a DoS attack simultaneously, therefore increasing its effectiveness and strength. The “army” carrying out the attack is mostly often composed of innocent infected zombie computers manipulated as bots and being part of a botnet controlled by the attacker via a Command and Control Server. A botnet is powerful, well coordinated and could count millions of computers. It also insures the anonymity of the original attacker since the attack traffic originates from the bots’ IPs rather than the attacker’s. In some cases, mostly in ideological DDoS attacks, this “army” could also be composed of recruited hackers/hacktivists participating in large DDoS attack

campaigns (Operation Blackout, Operation Payback etc.). DDoS attacks are hard to detect and block since the attack traffic is easily confused with legitimate traffic and difficult to trace.

There are many types of DDoS attacks targeting both the network and the application layers. They could be classified upon their impact on the targeted computing resources (saturating bandwidth, consuming server's resources, exhausting an application) or upon the targeted resources as well:

- Attacks targeting Network Resources: UDP Floods, ICMP Floods, IGMP Floods.
- Attacks targeting Server Resources: the TCP/IP weaknesses –TCP SYN Floods, TCP RST attacks, TCP PSH+ACK attacks – but also Low and Slow attacks as Sockstress for example and SSL-based attacks, which detection is particularly challenging.
- Attacks targeting the Application Resources: HTTP Floods, DNS Floods and other Low and Slow attacks as Slow HTTP GET requests (Slowloris) and Slow HTTP POST requests (R-U-Dead-Yet).

A DDoS attack usually comprises more than three attack vectors thus increasing the attacker's chances to hit its target and escape basic DoS mitigation solutions.

### **DoS (Denial-of-Service) Attack**

A Denial-of-Service DOS attack is an attack targeting the availability of web applications. Unlike other kinds of attacks, DoS attacks' primary goal is not to steal information but to slow or take down a web site. The attackers' motivations are diverse, ranging from simple fun, to financial gain and ideology (hacktivism). A DoS attack generates high or slow rate attack traffic exhausting computing resources of a target, therefore preventing legitimate users from accessing the website. DoS attacks affect enterprises from all sectors (e-gaming, Banking, Government etc.), all sizes (mid/big enterprises) and all locations. They target the network layer and up to the application layer, where attacks are more difficult to detect since they could easily get confused with legitimate traffic. There are several types of DoS attacks. A (non-distributed) DoS attack is when an attacker uses a single machine's resources to exhaust those of another machine, in order to prevent it from functioning normally. Large Web servers are usually robust enough to withstand a basic DoS attack from a single machine without suffering performance loss. A DoS attack famous variant is the DDoS or Distributed Denial of Service attack where the attack originates from multiple computers simultaneously, therefore causing the victim's resources exhaustion.

### **DNS Amplification Attack**

DNS amplification attack is a sophisticated denial of service attack that takes advantage of DNS servers' behavior in order to amplify the attack. In order to launch a DNS amplification

attack, the attacker performs two malicious tasks. First, the attacker spoofs the IP address of the DNS resolver and replaces it with the victim's IP address. This will cause all DNS replies from the DNS servers to be sent to the victim's servers. Second, the attacker finds an internet domain that is registered with many DNS records. During the attack, the attacker sends DNS queries that request the entire list of DNS records for that domain. This results in large replies from the DNS servers, usually so big that they need to be split over several packets. Using very few computers, the attacker sends a high rate of short DNS queries to the multiple DNS servers asking for the entire list of DNS records for the internet domain it chose earlier. The DNS servers look for the answer and provide it to the DNS resolver. However, because the attacker spoofed the IP address of the DNS resolver and set it to be the IP address of the victim, all the DNS replies from the servers are sent to the victim. The attacker achieves an amplification effect because for each short DNS query it sends, the DNS servers reply with a larger response, sometimes up to 100 times larger. Therefore, if the attacker generates 3 Mbps of DNS queries, it is actually amplified to 300Mbps of attack traffic on the victim. The victim is bombed with a high rate of large DNS replies where each reply is split over several packets. This requires the victim to reassemble the packet, which is a resource consuming task, and to attend to all of the attack traffic. Soon enough, the victim's servers become so busy handling the attack traffic that they cannot service any other request from legitimate users and the attacker achieves a denial-of-service.

## **DNS Flood**

A DNS Flood is an application-specific variant of a UDP flood. Since DNS servers use UDP traffic for name resolution, sending a massive number of DNS requests to a DNS server can consume its resources, resulting in a significantly slower response time for legitimate DNS requests.

## **Exploit**

An exploit is an implementation of a vulnerability meant to allow one to actually compromise a target. Exploits can be difficult to develop, as most modern vulnerabilities are much more complex than older ones due to the existence of advanced security measures and complicated constructs in modern hardware and software. Exploits based on previously unknown vulnerabilities, known as "Zero-Day" exploits are highly sought after by hackers and developers and manufacturers alike. By using a zero-day exploit, a hacker can guarantee that his or her attempt to break into a particular computer or device that possesses such vulnerability that the exploit is based on will succeed. Zero-day exploits are traded on both the black market and through legitimate middlemen between legitimate parties from anywhere between \$5,000 to \$250,000 depending on the effects of the exploit and which system they target. Where a PDF exploit might only fetch a few thousand dollars, a severe

exploit targeting the latest version of Apple's mobile operating system, iOS, might fetch \$100,000 or more.

## **Flood**

"Flood" is the generic term for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack in which the attacker attempts to constantly send traffic (often high volume of traffic) to a target server in an attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing it by consuming its resources. Types of floods include (but are not limited to): HTTP floods, ICMP floods, SYN floods, and UDP floods.

## **Hacker**

The term "hacker" has been used to mean various things in the world of computing: one who is able to subvert computer security (regardless of intentions), one who is a member of the open-source software community and subculture, and one who attempts to push the limits of computer software and hardware through home modifications. In the world of computer security, the term "hacker" is often portrayed as negative by mass media, despite the prevalence of "white hat hacking", or ethical hacking for the purpose of discovering potential security flaws and reporting them to the proper individuals or organizations so that the flaws may be patched. Black hat hacking, on the other hand, is the breaking into computer systems without any intention of reporting discovered vulnerabilities, often with malicious or financial incentives. The hackers who fall somewhere on the spectrum between "white hats" and "black hats" are referred to as "grey hats". Grey hat hackers will often perform mischievous activities with (usually non-malicious although at times questionably ethical) motivations. Additionally, grey hat hackers often choose not to report security flaws to the proper channels; rather, they report such information to the hacking community and the general public, enjoy watching the fallout as those with the security flaws scramble to fix them before they can be abused by black hat hackers. Within the open-source software and computer hobbyist communities, however, "hacker" usually has a less negative connotation. Within these cultures, hackers are often individuals regarded as intelligent and clever, and able to come up with creative solutions to existing problems that a software or hardware product developer may have not thought of or publicly released yet. These hackers often refer to "hackers" within the computer security world as "crackers" (as in safe-cracker) to emphasize their belief that calling such individuals "hackers" is incorrect. With the rise of hacker and "hacktivist" groups such as LulzSec (now LulzSec Reborn) and Anonymous, the mass media portrayal of the term "hacker" continues to lead the general public to believe "hacker" is synonymous with "cybercriminal".

## **Hacktivist**

“Hacktivist”, a portmanteau of “hack” and “activism”, was a term coined in 1996 by Omega, a member of the hacking coalition “Cult of the Dead Crow” (cDc). The term can be loosely defined as, “the ethically ambiguous use of computers and computer networks in order to affect the normal operation of other systems, motivated by a desire to protest or promote political ends.” Oftentimes these events take the form of web site defacements, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, web site parodies, virtual sit-ins, typo squatting, and virtual sabotage. The term has become popular among media outlets in recent years due to the rise of various politically motivated cyber attacks by groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec (now LulzSec Reborn) on governments and corporations across the world.

## **Honeypot**

In computer security, a honeypot is a program or a server voluntarily made vulnerable in order to attract and lure hackers. The attackers who think they are targeting a real resource behave “normally”, using their attack techniques and tools against this lure site, which allow the defenders to observe and monitor their activities, analyze their attacking methods, learn and prepare the adequate defenses for the real resources. There are several kinds of honeypots, some used for research purposes only while others are actively acting as defenses for the real sites.

## **HTTP Flood**

An HTTP flood is an attack method used by hackers to attack web servers and applications. It consists of seemingly legitimate session-based sets of HTTP GET or POST requests sent to a target web server. These requests are specifically designed to consume a significant amount of the server’s resources, and therefore can result in a denial-of-service condition (without necessarily requiring a high rate of network traffic). Such requests are often sent en masse by means of a botnet, increasing the attack’s overall power. HTTP flood attacks may be one of the most advanced non-vulnerability threats facing web servers today. It is very hard for network security devices to distinguish between legitimate HTTP traffic and malicious HTTP traffic, and if not handled correctly, it could cause a high number of false-positive detections. Rate-based detection engines are also not successful at detecting HTTP flood attacks, as the traffic volume of HTTP floods may be under detection thresholds. Because of this, it is necessary to use several parameters detection including rate-based and rate-invariant.

## **I2P**

I2P is an anonymous overlay network - a network within a network. It is intended to protect communication from dragnet surveillance and monitoring by third parties such as ISPs.

## ICMP Flood

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is a connectionless protocol used for IP operations, diagnostics, and errors. An ICMP Flood - the sending of an abnormally large number of ICMP packets of any type (especially network latency testing “ping” packets) - can overwhelm a target server that attempts to process every incoming ICMP request, and this can result in a denial-of-service condition for the target server.

## Internet pipe saturation

These attacks are volumetric floods and often involve flooding the target with an overwhelming bandwidth. Common attacks utilize UDP as it is easily spoofed and difficult to mitigate downstream. Out of state, SYN floods and malformed packets are also often seen. While many attacks aim at saturating inbound bandwidth, it’s not uncommon for attackers to identify and pull large files from websites, ftp shares, etc. in order to saturate outbound bandwidth as well.

## IP Address

An IP address is an identifier for a device connected to a network using TCP/IP - a protocol that routes network traffic based on the IP address of its destination. IP addresses can either be 32-bit IPv4 addresses consisting of four base-10 numbers separated by periods representing eight digit binary (base-2) numbers called “octets” (i.e. 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255), or 128-bit IPv6 addresses consisting of eight hexadecimal (base-16) numbers separated by colons representing sixteen digit binary (base-2) numbers (i.e.

0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000 to FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF where consecutive groups of four zeroes are replaced by a double colon). When the Internet first became popular, IPv4, with its 32-bit addresses, offered 232, or roughly  $4.3 \times 10^9$  unique addresses. As the number of Internet-connected devices began to grow significantly, people worried that the IPv4 protocol would not contain enough addresses to meet the growing demand for new unique addresses this is why IPv4 will eventually be replaced by IPv6 on a large scale (IPv6 already officially launched in August 2012), which contains  $2^{128}$  or roughly  $3.4 \times 10^{38}$  unique addresses. The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), which runs on special devices (usually routers) allows for the assigning of IP addresses within a local area network (LAN). DHCP assigns IP addresses on a temporary “lease” basis; once a device’s IP address lease expires, a DHCP server will assign it a new (potentially different) one. IP addresses automatically assigned by a DHCP server are therefore referred to as “dynamic IP addresses”, as a device with a DHCP-assigned IP address may eventually receive an IP different from its original one.

DHCP servers will not assign devices just any IP address in the maximum range of IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255), as certain IP addresses are reserved for special purposes. Such addresses include:

- 0.0.0.0 – Represents the “default” network, i.e. any connection
- 255.255.255.255 – Represents the broadcast address, or place to route messages to be sent to every device within a network
- 127.0.0.1 – Represents “localhost” or the “loopback address”, allowing a device to refer to itself, regardless of what network it is connected to
- 169.254.X.X – Represents a “self-assigned IP address”, which a device will assign itself if it is unable to receive an IP address from a DHCP server

Users’ DHCP-assigned IP addresses on a LAN are not the same as their “external” or Internet IP address. This address will be the same for all users connected to a DHCP server, which itself receives an IP address from the Internet Service Provider (ISP) it is connected to. As IP addresses can be used as unique identifiers for users’ machines (and subsequently the users themselves), knowledge of a malicious user’s external Internet IP address can allow law enforcement officials to block, locate, and eventually arrest him or her. As a result, the more advanced attack tools and hackers will employ anonymization techniques - such as the use of proxy servers, VPNs, or a routing network like Tor or I2P - that can make it seem like they are using a different IP address other than their own, located somewhere else in the world. An attack tool called Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) became infamous for not hiding its users’ IP addresses; this resulted in the arrest of various LOIC users around the world for their participation in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

## **IP Spoofing**

IP Spoofing is the act of creating an IP packet with a forged source IP address for the purpose of hiding the true source IP address, usually for the purpose of launching special types of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS attacks). By forging the source IP address of a packet; the individual sending it can direct the target IP address’ machine to send its reply packet somewhere other than the real IP address of the source machine. Those wishing to launch DDoS attacks without large botnets can therefore send packets with random spoofed source IP addresses in order to both conceal their own identity and make the attack harder to block (as it looks like it is originating from many sources).

## **IRC (Internet Relay Chat)**

IRC (Internet Relay Chat) is a protocol for real-time text messaging between internet-connected computers created in 1988. It is mainly used for group discussion in chat rooms called “channels” although it supports private messages between two users, data transfer,

and various server-side and client-side commands. As of April 2011, the top 100 IRC networks served over 500,000 users at a time on hundreds of thousands of channels. IRC is a popular method used by botnet owners to send commands to the individual computers in their botnet. This is done either on a specific channel, on a public IRC network, or on a separate IRC server. The IRC server containing the channel(s) that are used to control bots is referred to as a “command and control” or C2 server.

### **ISP (Internet Service Provider)**

An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is a company that provides internet access for its customers. ISPs are required by law in many countries to provide a certain level of monitoring capabilities to aid government law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and are often asked by such officials to intervene during cyber attacks by cutting off internet service to the offending machines.

### **itsoknoproblembro**

The 'itsoknoproblembro' tool was designed and implemented as a general purpose PHP script injected into a victim's machine allowing the attacker to upload and execute arbitrary Perl scripts on the target's machine. The 'itsoknoproblembro' script injects an encrypted payload, in order to bypass IPS and Malware gateways into the website main file index.php, allowing the attacker to upload new Perl scripts at any time. Initial server infection is usually done by using the well known Remote File Inclusion (RFI) technique. By uploading Perl scripts that run different DOS flood vectors, the server might act as a Bot in a DDOS Botnet army. Although originally designed for general purpose, some variants of this tool found in the wild were customized to act as a proprietary DDOS tool, implementing the flood vector logics inside without the need to upload additional scripts.

### **Malware**

“Malware”, short for “malicious software”, is any program designed to help a hacker negatively affect the normal operation of a computer. Most forms of malware - including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, adware, and rootkits - are intended to allow hackers to gain unauthorized access to a machine, without the knowledge of its owner, in order to perform criminal tasks including information theft and amassing botnets to perform distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Computer users are often tricked into installing malware through social engineering techniques, or are unaware that a seemingly non-malware infected program they have installed was infected, containing additional code designed to stealthily perform malicious tasks.

## **MSSP**

An MSSP (Managed Security Service Provider) is an organization which provides "Security as a Service" (Sec-aaS) and may include elaborate operations such as SOC's and NOCs, or something as simple as a cloud-based key management service. Generally speaking, an MSSP is considered an outsourced operation of what was an internal security device or process management function.

## **Network scan**

Scanning is typically an automated process that is used to discover devices such as pc, server and peripherals that exist on a network. Results can include details of the discovered devices, including IP addresses, device names, operating systems, running applications/services, open shares, usernames and groups. Scanning is often related to pre -attack or reconnaissance activities. There are two types of scanning: Horizontal Scan in which the scanner scans for the same port on multiple IPs, and Vertical Scan in which the scanner scans multiple ports on one IP.

## **Packet**

A packet is a formatted unit of data used to transmit information piece by piece across a packet switched network. Packets usually contain three sections: a header, the payload, and a trailer (also called "footer"). A packet header contains information such as the length of the packet (if the network does not use a predetermined fixed packet size), synchronization bits to help the packet match up with the network, a packet number to differentiate each packet from the others, the protocol (i.e. type of information contained within the packet), and the source and destination IP addresses. The "payload" of a packet contains the actual information being transmitted. The trailer or "footer" usually contains a series of bits signaling to the receiving device that it has reached the end of the packet, as well as some type of error-checking information to ensure that the packet was not modified in transit.

## **Port Scan**

A port scanner is a technical leverage to identify available technical services (ports) on a server or application and may include logic to evaluate whether or not those services are vulnerable to common exploits or configuration issues. This is done by sending predetermined traffic to the target and based on a response or lack of a response, the port scanner in use makes its own conclusions with regards to the functionality of the port being scanned.

## **Reflector/Reflective DoS attacks**

Reflection Denial of Service attacks makes use of a potentially legitimate third party component to send the attack traffic to a victim, ultimately hiding the attackers' own identity. The attackers send packets to the reflector servers with a source IP address set to their victim's IP therefore indirectly overwhelming the victim with the response packets.

The reflector servers used for this purpose could be ordinary servers not obviously compromised, which makes this kind of attack particularly difficult to mitigate. A common example for this type of attack is Reflective DNS Response attack.

## **SIP Brute Force**

SIP brute force is an adaptation of normal brute force attacks which attack SIP servers and attempt access to servers to make unauthorized outbound calls at another's expense.

## **SIP Client Call Flood**

This is a flood technique focused on SIP application protocol which involves illegitimate call requests. The idea here is to flood the Session Boarder Control (SBC) and / or SIP / VOIP PBX with too many requests to handle and thus making the service unavailable.

## **SIP Malformed Attack**

Application layer attack on the Session Initiation Protocol- SIP in use in VoIP services, targeted at causing denial of service to SIP servers. A SIP malformed attack consists of sending any kind of non-standard messages (malformed SIP Invite for ex) with an intentionally invalid input, therefore making the system unstable.

## **SIP Register flood**

Application layer attack on the Session Initiation Protocol- SIP in use in VoIP services, targeted at causing denial of service to SIP servers. A SIP Register flood consists of sending a high volume of SIP REGISTER or INVITE packets to SIP servers (indifferently accepting endpoint requests as first step of an authentication process), therefore exhausting their bandwidth and resource

## **SIP Server Flood**

Application layer attack on the Session Initiation Protocol- SIP (in use in VoIP services), targeted denial of service to SIP servers. Common attack vectors include SIP invite and register floods.

## **Scrubbing Center**

A centralized data cleansing station where traffic is analyzed and malicious traffic (ddos, known vulnerabilities and exploits) is removed. Scrubbing centers are often used in large enterprises, such as ISP and Cloud providers, as they often prefer to off-ramp traffic to an out of path centralized data cleansing station. When under attack, the traffic is redirected (typically using DNS or BGP) to the scrubbing center where an attack mitigation system mitigates the attack traffic and passes clean traffic back to the network for delivery. The scrubbing center should be equipped to sustain high volumetric floods at the network and application layers, low and slow attacks, RFC Compliance checks, known vulnerabilities and zero day anomalies.

## **Social Engineering**

Social Engineering (within the context of computer security) is the act of using psychological manipulation in order to gain access to sensitive information, computers, or computer networks. Many famous computer hackers (both white hat and black hat) have used social engineering in combination with computer-related methods in order to gain information; reformed cyber criminal Kevin Mitnick admitted that it's much easier to trick a person into giving up sensitive passwords or information than it is to obtain the same material solely through the use of computers. One example of a social engineering technique is "pretexting", or engaging the target subject in a specific manner with some form of background information that makes it more likely that he or she will divulge sensitive information. Pretexting often involves extensive research, as the social engineer will need to prepare answers to identifying questions that he or she may be asked during the process of obtaining information. This newly obtained information can often be used in further pretexting attempts, especially in scenarios where the social engineer wishes to gain even greater access to his or her target.

## **SQL Injection**

SQL injection is an attack targeting web applications taking advantage of poor application coding where the inputs are not sanitized therefore exposing application vulnerabilities. SQL injection is the most famous type of injection attacks which also count LDAP or XML injections. The idea behind a sql injection is to modify an application SQL (database language) query in order to access or modify unauthorized data or run malicious programs. Most web applications indeed rely on databases where the application data is stored and being accessed by SQL queries and modifications of these queries could mean taking control of the application. An attacker would for example be able to access the application database with administrator access, run remote commands on the server, drop or create objects in the database and more.

For instance, the sql query below, aiming at authenticating users, is common in web applications:

- myQuery= "SELECT \* FROM userstable WHERE username = 'userinput1' and password ='userinput2';"
- Replacing userinput1 by: 'OR 1=1'); -- would result in granting the attacker access to the database without knowing the real username and password as the assertion "1=1" is always true and the rest of the query is being ignored by the comment character (- - in our case).
- Replacing the userinput1 by ' OR 1=1"); drop table users;-- would additionally drop the application users table.

## **SYN Flood**

A SYN flood is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that relies on abusing the standard way that a TCP connection is established. Typically, a client sends a SYN packet to an open port on a server asking for a TCP connection. The server then acknowledges the connection by sending SYN-ACK packet back to the client and populating the client's information in its Transmission Control Block (TCB) table. The client then responds to the server with an ACK packet establishing the connection. This process is commonly known as a "three-way handshake". A SYN flood overwhelms a target machine by sending thousands of connection requests to it using spoofed IP addresses. This causes the target machine to attempt to open a connection for each malicious request and subsequently wait for an ACK packet that never arrives. A server under a SYN flood attack will continue to wait for a SYN-ACK packet for each connection request, as the delay could be normal and related to network congestion. However, because a SYN-ACK packet never arrives for any of the connection requests; the massive number of half-open connections quickly fills up the server's TCB table before it can time any connections out. This process continues for as long as the flood attack continues. Attackers will sometimes add legitimate information to their requests as well, such as sequence number or source port 0, as this increases a target server's CPU usage on top of causing network congestion, and could more effectively cause a denial-of-service condition.

## **TCP Flood**

TCP SYN floods are one of the oldest yet still very popular Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The most common attack involves sending numerous SYN packets to the victim. The attack in many cases will spoof the SRC IP meaning that the reply (SYN+ACK packet) will not come back to it. The intention of this attack is overwhelm the session/connection tables of the targeted server or one of the network entities on the way (typically the firewall). Servers need to open a state for each SYN packet that arrives and they store this state in tables that have limited

size. As big as this table may be it is easy to send sufficient amount of SYN packets that will fill the table, and once this happens the server starts to drop a new request, including legitimate ones. Similar effects can happen on a firewall which also has to process and invest in each SYN packet. Unlike other TCP or application level attacks the attacker does not have to use a real IP; this is perhaps the biggest strength of the attack.

## **Tor**

Tor is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the Internet. It also enables software developers to create new communication tools with built-in privacy features. Tor provides the foundation for a range of applications that allow organizations and individuals to share information over public networks without compromising their privacy.

## **UDP Flood**

A UDP flood is a network flood and still one of the most common floods today. The attacker sends UDP packets, typically large ones, to single destination or to random ports. In most cases the attackers spoof the SRC IP which is easy to do since the UDP protocol is “connectionless” and does not have any type of handshake mechanism or session. The main intention of a UDP flood is to saturate the Internet pipe. Another impact of this attack is on the network and security elements on the way to the target server, and most typically the firewalls. Firewalls open a state for each UDP packet and will be overwhelmed by the UDP flood connections very fast.

## **Vulnerability**

A vulnerability (in computer security) is any weakness in a computer system, network, software, or any device that allows one to circumvent security measures and perform actions not intended by its developers or manufacturers. Vulnerabilities range from minor to major, with the most significant allowing for privilege escalation (unauthorized administrator or root privileges) or code execution (the running of unsigned 3rd party software). New vulnerabilities can often be discovered by the process of “fuzzing”, or purposely trying to break something by attempting to give it unreasonable input values. Once some kind of crash occurs and can be analyzed, one can discover the existence of a vulnerability that may have not been previously documented. Previously unknown vulnerabilities, known as “Zero-Day” vulnerabilities are highly sought after by hackers and developers and manufacturers alike. By using an exploit based on zero-day vulnerability, a hacker can guarantee that his or her attempt to break into a particular computer or device that possesses such vulnerability will succeed. Zero-day exploits are traded on both the black market and through legitimate middlemen between parties for anywhere from \$5,000 to \$250,000 depending on the effects

of the exploit and which system they target. Where a PDF exploit might only fetch a few thousand dollars, a severe exploit targeting the latest version of Apple's mobile operating system, iOS, might fetch \$100,000 or more.

### **Vulnerability Scanner**

A vulnerability scanner is a type of computer program used to gather information on computers and systems on a network in order to find their weaknesses. By using a vulnerability scanner tool such as nmap or unicornscan, one can determine the number of clients attached to a particular network as well as various information regarding their addresses, ports, applications and services and potential exploits that can be used against them. Some scanners offer the ability to deploy payloads for the purpose of using a found exploit, and others simply display information on network topology. Types of vulnerability scanners include: port scanners, network enumerators, network vulnerability scanners, web application security scanners, database security scanners, ERP security scanners, and computer worms (which require scanning capabilities to spread within a network).

### **Wireshark**

Wireshark is a free cross-platform open-source network traffic capture and analysis utility. It began as a project called "Ethereal" in the late 1990s, but its name was changed to "Wireshark" in 2006 due to trademark issues. The initial code was written by Gerald Combs, a computer science graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City, today the Wireshark website now lists over 600 contributors. The program is GUI-based and uses pcap to capture packets, although there is also a command-line version of Wireshark called TShark with the same functionality. Wireshark essentially "understands" the formats of various types of network packets, and is able to display the header and content information of captured packets in an easy-to-read format with various filtering options. Packets can be either captured directly with Wireshark, or captured with a separate utility and later viewed within Wireshark. As a powerful (and free) network analysis tool, Wireshark has become an industry standard utility for network traffic analysis.

### **Zeus**

Zeus is a well-known Trojan Horse that steals financial information from a user's browser using man-in-the-browser key logging and form grabbing. Additionally, Zeus installs a backdoor on the machines it infects, so these machines can become part of a botnet used for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and other malicious activities. Zeus was first detected in 2007 when it was used to attack the United States Department of Transportation, however, it did not become significantly widespread until March 2009. Attacks involving the use of Zeus occurred throughout 2010, including an October 2010 attack by a large organized

crime ring attempting to steal over \$70M from individuals in the US with Zeus-infected computers. The FBI made over 90 arrests of suspected members in the US, and various others were arrested in the UK and Ukraine in connection with the attack. In May 2011 the source code of the version used then of Zeus (v2) was leaked, leading to various customized Zeus-based bots being created. Some of the more advanced custom bots based on the leaked code (such as Ice IX) attempted to fix many of the existing issues with Zeus rendering it even harder to detect. However, many security researchers have discovered that even the most well-known custom versions are extremely similar to the original leaked Zeus source code, and are therefore not significantly more innovative or dangerous.

### **Zero-Day/Zero-Minute Attack**

A Zero-Day (or Zero-Minute) Attack is a type of attack that uses a previously unknown vulnerability. Because the attack is occurring before “Day 1” of the vulnerability being publicly known, it is said that the attack occurred on “Day 0” - hence the name. Zero-Day exploits are highly sought after - often bought and sold by private firms anywhere from \$5,000 to \$250,000, depending on what applications and operating systems they target - as they almost guarantee that an attacker is able to stealthily circumvent the security measures of his or her target. Private security firms aside, software vendors will also usually offer a monetary reward among other incentives to report zero-day vulnerabilities in their own software directly to them.

### **Zombie**

A “zombie” or “bot” is a compromised computer under the control of an attacker who often controls many other compromised machines that together make up a botnet. The term “zombie” was coined to describe such an infected computer because the computer’s owner is often not aware that his or her computer is being used for malicious activities.

## **References**

<http://security.radware.com/knowledge-center/DDoSPedia/>



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