



# OPERATIONS & INTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL CYBER SECURITY REPORT

Metrobank S.A.

June, 2018

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## Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	2
About This Report .....	3
Confidentiality .....	3
Managed Vulnerability Service .....	4
Description by Host .....	6
Vulnerabilities found by severity .....	8
Critical Risk Level Vulnerabilities.....	8
High Risk Level Vulnerabilities .....	9
Medium Risk Level Vulnerabilities .....	11
Low Risk Level Vulnerabilities .....	16
Threats.....	20

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## About This Report

This report is a companion to the Monthly Operations & Intelligence Executive Report. The purpose of this document is to provide Technical and Tactical level information, detail and recommendations to the extent that can be summarized. GLESEC processes significant amount of data and not all can be presented in a detail report format. For more information you can review the dashboards of the GMP or if necessary contact us at the GLESEC Operation Centers (GOC).

## Confidentiality

GLESEC considers the confidentiality of client's information as a trade secret. The information in this context is classified as:

- Client name and contact information
- System architecture, configuration, access methods and access control
- Security content

All the above information is kept secure to the extent in which GLESEC secures its own confidential information.

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## Managed Vulnerability Service (MSS-VM)

*The Managed Vulnerability Service (MSS-VM) enables organizations to minimize the risk of vulnerabilities by quickly discovering weaknesses, measuring the potential risk and exposure, reporting, providing remediation information necessary to mitigate those risks on an on-going basis and facilitating reporting and compliance with regulations and best practices.*

In the range of addresses given by Metrobank S.A., we have found a total of 13 hosts, of which 10 are vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are divided into the following severities, as shown in the following table. In addition, you can observe the risk value score of your organization according to our metrics, there was an increase compared to last month, this is due to the fact that a critical host was found in their systems. This was reported to your organization.

Total IP's Scanned		IP's Vulnerable		
13		10		
Risk Distribution				
Critical	High	Medium	Low	Total
1	11	32	16	60
<p>According to the metrics:                      RV= 0.344230769</p> <p>The following values are to clarify RV:                      RV=1 Points to every IP address in the infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks                      RV=0 Points to no IP address in the infrastructure aret susceptible to attacks                      RV=0.1 Point to 1/10 IP address in the infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks</p>				

All the vulnerabilities found in your organization belong to the following categories:

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Category ▾	Critical ▾	High ▾	Medium ▾	Low ▾	Total ▾
General	0	0	25	7	32
Service detection	0	11	0	2	13
Misc.	0	0	5	6	11
Windows	1	0	2	0	3
Web Servers	0	0	0	1	1

- General (53%).
- Misc (18%).
- Services Detection (21%).
- Windows (5%)
- Web Server (1.66%).

Additional details about these vulnerabilities are presented in the Vulnerabilities found in Metrobank S.A by severity section of the MSS-VM on page 7.

Metrobank continues to present critical, medium and low level vulnerabilities, which we have been reporting in recent months.

In this period there were vulnerabilities of high severity related to the TLS Version 1.0 protocol, in our report are the details of all these vulnerabilities together with the host and their solutions.

The 5 ports considered most vulnerable for this period were 443 (HTTPS), 25 (SMTP), 3389 (RDP), 80 (http), and port 22 (SSH). This is due to the fact that many vulnerabilities related to them were found and the majority is classified at a medium severity level.

The host 190.34.183.139 has all these ports vulnerable. Ports 80 and 443 are of critical consideration in host 190.34.183.131. Host 190.34.183.148 has 2 vulnerabilities (SSL Certificate Cannot be Trusted and SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported) of medium severity on port 25 (SMTP).

The 5 most vulnerable hosts are: 190.34.183.139, 190.34.183.142, 190.34.183.152, 190.34.183.154 and 190.34.183.149; all with low and medium severity. These same vulnerabilities have been reported in previous periods


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There is a low percentage of vulnerability between categories of detection of services, port scanners, web servers and firewalls (Check Point) that meet an "informative" severity level, on port 18264 (hosts: 190.34.183.90 190.34.183.132) and 264 (hosts: 190.34.183.91,190.34.183.90 190.34.183.132).

<https://190.34.183.132/>

We attach the image, showing the stated above



IP 190.34.183.152 <https://www.metrobanksa.com/metrobank/es> y 190.34.183.154 have increased the number of vulnerabilities for this period, while the others maintain the same amount recorded in May.


## Descriptions by Host

The remote host <http://190.34.183.139/> is affected the action of Fingerprinting. This vulnerability is known OS Fingerprinting is a technique that involves analyzing the footprints left by an operating system in its network connections. It is based on the response times to the different packages, to establish a connection in the TCP / IP protocol, which is used by the different operating systems. We recommend applying more security to your servers

We attach the image, showing the stated above.

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The remote host 190.34.183.131 (<https://www.govimar.com.pa/>) is affected vulnerability in HTTP.sys Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3042553), which affects Windows systems (ports 80/443); We recommend to apply all the security updates suggested by Windows, especially MS15-034 (KB 3042553), since they all solve the vulnerabilities found in this type of system.

Other vulnerabilities were SSLv3 Padding Oracle in degraded inherited vulnerability (POODLE) and RC4 SSL encryption suites (Bar Mitzvah) in different servers:


<https://mail.metrobanksa.com/owa/auth/logon.aspx?replaceCurrent=1&url=https%3a%2f%2fmail.metrobanksa.com%2fowa%2f> (190.34.183.149),

<https://www.metrobanksa.com/metrobank/es> (190.34.184.152),

Including the main web portal of Metrobank S.A and the Outlook web application. Vulnerabilities present last month.

We attach the image, showing the stated above

Seguro | <https://mail.metrobanksa.com/owa/auth/logon.aspx?replaceCurrent=1&url=https%3a%2f%2fmail.metrobanksa.com%2f>



## Vulnerabilities by severity

The following section will describe in detail each vulnerability found according to their severity.

### *Critical Risk Level Vulnerabilities*

#### **MS15-034: Vulnerability in HTTP.sys Could Allow Remote Code Execution**

##### **Description**

The version of Windows running on the remote host is affected by an integer overflow condition in the HTTP protocol stack (HTTP.sys) due to improper parsing of crafted HTTP requests. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this to execute arbitrary code with System privileges.

##### **Solution**

Microsoft has released a set of patches for Windows 7, 2008 R2, 8, 8.1, 2012, and 2012 R2

##### **Affected Systems**

80 / tcp / possible\_wls      190.34.183.131

---

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.131

**Output**

```
HTTP response status: HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
```

```
HTTP response status: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

### *High Risk Level Vulnerabilities*

**TLS Version 1.0 Protocol Detection****Description**

The remote service accepts connections encrypted using TLS 1.0. TLS 1.0 has a number of cryptographic design flaws. Modern implementations of TLS 1.0 mitigate these problems, but newer versions of TLS like 1.1 and 1.2 are designed against these flaws and should be used whenever possible.

PCI DSS v3.2 requires that TLS 1.0 be disabled entirely by June 30, 2018, except for POS POI terminals (and the SSL/TLS termination points to which they connect) that can be verified as not being susceptible to any known exploits.

**Solution**

Enable support for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, and disable support for TLS 1.0.

**Affected Systems**

25 / tcp / smtp 190.34.183.148

443 / tcp / possible\_wls

190.34.183.90, 190.34.183.91, 190.34.183.132, 190.34.183.149, 190.34.183.152,  
190.34.183.154



**SSL Version 2 and 3 Protocol Detection****Description**

The remote service accepts connections encrypted using SSL 2.0 and/or SSL 3.0. These versions of SSL are affected by several cryptographic flaws, including:

1. An insecure padding scheme with CBC ciphers.
2. Insecure session renegotiation and resumption schemes.

An attacker can exploit these flaws to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or to decrypt communications between the affected service and clients.

Although SSL/TLS has a secure means for choosing the highest supported version of the protocol (so that these versions will be used only if the client or server support nothing better), many web browsers implement this in an unsafe way that allows an attacker to downgrade a connection (such as in POODLE). Therefore, it is recommended that these protocols be disabled entirely.

*NIST has determined that SSL 3.0 is no longer acceptable for secure communications. As of the date of enforcement found in PCI DSS v3.1, any version of SSL will not meet the PCI SSC's definition of 'strong cryptography'.*

**Solution**

Consult the application's documentation to disable SSL 2.0 and 3.0. Use TLS 1.1 (with approved cipher suites) or higher instead.

**Affected Systems**

9443 / tcp / possible_wls	190.34.183.139
8089 / tcp / possible_wls	190.34.183.139
443 / tcp / possible_wls	190.34.183.139 190.34.183.142 190.34.183.149

**Output**

```
- SSLv3 is enabled and the server supports at least one cipher.
```



*Medium Risk Level Vulnerabilities*

**SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported**

**Description**

The remote host supports the use of SSL ciphers that offer medium strength encryption. GLESEC regards medium strength as any encryption that uses key lengths at least 64 bits and less than 112 bits, or else that uses the 3DES encryption suite.

*Note: Reconfigure the affected application if possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers*

**Solution**

Reconfigure the affected application if possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers.

**Affected Systems**

- 9443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139
- 25 / tcp / smtp 190.34.183.148
- 8089 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139
- 443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.90,190.34.183.91,190.34.183.132, 190.34.183.139, 190.34.183.142, 190.34.183.149, 190.34.183.152

**Output**

```
Here is the list of medium strength SSL ciphers supported by the remote server :
Medium Strength Ciphers (> 64-bit and < 112-bit key, or 3DES)
DES-CBC3-SHA          Kx=RSA          Au=RSA          Enc=3DES-CBC(168)    Mac=SHA1
The fields above are :
{OpenSSL ciphername}
Kx={key exchange}
Au={authentication}
Enc={symmetric encryption method}
Mac={message authentication code}
{export flag}
```

**SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted**

**Description**

The server's X.509 certificate cannot be trusted. This situation can occur in three

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different ways, in which the chain of trust can be broken, as stated below:

1. First, the top of the certificate chain sent by the server might not be descended from a known public certificate authority. This can occur either when the top of the chain is an unrecognized, self-signed certificate, or when intermediate certificates are missing that would connect the top of the certificate chain to a known public certificate authority.
2. Second, the certificate chain may contain a certificate that is not valid at the time of the scan. This can occur either when the scan occurs before one of the certificate's 'notBefore' dates, or after one of the certificate's 'notAfter' dates.
3. Third, the certificate chain may contain a signature that either didn't match the certificate's information or could not be verified. Bad signatures can be fixed by getting the certificate with the bad signature to be re-signed by its issuer. Signatures that could not be verified are the result of the certificate's issuer using a signing algorithm that Nessus either does not support or does not recognize.
4. If the remote host is a public host in production, any break in the chain makes it more difficult for users to verify the authenticity and identity of the web server. This could make it easier to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote host.

### Solution

Purchase or generate a proper certificate for this service.

### Affected Systems

25 / tcp / smtp      190.34.183.148

### Output

```
The following certificate was at the top of the certificate
chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown
certificate authority :
```

```
|-Subject : C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama/OU=Metrobank/O=Metrobank, S.A./CN=correo.metrobanksa.com
|-Issuer : C=BE/O=GlobalSign nv-sa/CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2
```



**Affected Systems**

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.154

**Output**

The following certificate was at the top of the certificate chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown certificate authority :

```
| -Subject : 2.5.4.15=Private
Organization/2.5.4.5=1991/1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=PA/C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama/2.5.4.9=Ground
Floor, Metrobank Tower/OU=Metrobank/O=Metrobank, S.A./CN=metronet.metrobanksa.com
| -Issuer : C=BE/O=GlobalSign nv-sa/CN=GlobalSign Extended Validation CA - SHA256 - G3
```

**Affected Systems**

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.142

**Output**

The following certificate was at the top of the certificate chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown certificate authority :

```
| -Subject : C=PA/CN=190.34.183.142/O=Glesec Panama, S.A./OU=Radware Web Management
| -Issuer : C=PA/CN=190.34.183.142/O=Glesec Panama, S.A./OU=Radware Web Management
```

**Affected Systems**

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.90190.34.183.91190.34.183.132

**Output**

The following certificate was at the top of the certificate chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown certificate authority :

```
| -Subject : O=fwmetro..5afb7i
| -Issuer : O=fwmetro..5afb7i
```

**Affected Systems**

3389 / tcp / msrdp 190.34.183.139

8443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139

**Output**

```
The following certificate was at the top of the certificate
chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown
certificate authority :
```

```
|-Subject : CN=AppServer.metrobank.local
|-Issuer  : CN=AppServer.metrobank.local
```

```
The following certificate was at the top of the certificate
chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown
certificate authority :
```

```
|-Subject : C=PA/ST=Panama/L=Panama/OU=Metrobank/O=Metrobank, S.A./CN=appserver.metrobanksa.com
|-Issuer  : C=BE/O=GlobalSign nv-sa/CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2
```

### **Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol CRIME Vulnerability**

#### **Description**

The remote service has one of two configurations that are known to be required for the CRIME attack :

- SSL / TLS compression is enabled.
- TLS advertises the SPDY protocol earlier than version 4.

#### **Solution**

Disable compression and / or the SPDY service.

#### **Affected Systems**

8089 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139

#### **Output**

```
The following configuration indicates that the remote service
may be vulnerable to the CRIME attack :
```

- SSL / TLS compression is enabled.

### **SSLv3 Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption Vulnerability(POODLE)**

#### **Description**

The remote host is affected by a man-in-the-middle (MitM) information disclosure

vulnerability known as POODLE. The vulnerability is due to the way SSL 3.0 handles padding bytes when decrypting messages encrypted using block ciphers in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode.

MitM attackers can decrypt a selected byte of a cipher text in as few as 256 tries if they are able to force a victim application to repeatedly send the same data over newly created SSL 3.0 connections.

As long as a client and service both support SSLv3, a connection can be 'rolled back' to SSLv3, even if TLSv1 or newer is supported by the client and service.

The TLS Fallback SCSV mechanism prevents 'version rollback' attacks without impacting legacy clients; however, it can only protect connections when the client and service support the mechanism. Sites that cannot disable SSLv3 immediately should enable this mechanism.

This is vulnerability in the SSLv3 specification, not in any particular SSL implementation. Disabling SSLv3 is the only way to completely mitigate the vulnerability.

*Note: Services that must support SSLv3 should enable the TLS Fallback SCSV mechanism until SSLv3 can be disabled.*

### Solution

Disable SSLv3.

### Affected Systems

9443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139,190.34.183.142,190.34.183.149

### Output

```
cipher suite, indicating that this server is vulnerable.
```

```
It appears that TLSv1 or newer is supported on the server. However, the
Fallback SCSV mechanism is not supported, allowing connections to be "rolled
back" to SSLv3.
```

### Microsoft Exchange Client Access Server Information Disclosure



### Description

The Microsoft Exchange Client Access Server (CAS) is affected by an information disclosure vulnerability. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to learn the server's internal IP address.

### Affected Systems

443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.149

### Output

```
GET /autodiscover/autodiscover.xml HTTP/1.0
Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.9,*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)
Pragma: no-cache
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */*
```

Which returned the following IP address :

```
10.1.1.235
```

## Low Risk Level Vulnerabilities

### SSL RC4 Cipher Suites Supported (Bar Mitzvah)

#### Description

The remote host supports the use of RC4 in one or more cipher suites.

The RC4 cipher is flawed in its generation of a pseudo-random stream of bytes so that a wide variety of small biases are introduced into the stream, decreasing its randomness.

If plaintext is repeatedly encrypted (e.g., HTTP cookies), and an attacker is able to obtain many (i.e., tens of millions) ciphertexts, the attacker may be able to derive the plaintext.

#### Solution

Reconfigure the affected application, if possible, to avoid use of RC4 ciphers. Consider using TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM suites subject to browser and web server support.

**Affected Systems**

9443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139  
 443 / tcp / possible\_wls 190.34.183.139,190.34.183.142,190.34.183.149

**Output**

```
List of RC4 cipher suites supported by the remote server :

High Strength Ciphers (>= 112-bit key)

RC4-MD5          Kx=RSA      Au=RSA      Enc=RC4 (128)   Mac=MD5
RC4-SHA          Kx=RSA      Au=RSA      Enc=RC4 (128)   Mac=SHA1

The fields above are :

{OpenSSL ciphername}
Kx={key exchange}
Au={authentication}
Enc={symmetric encryption method}
Mac={message authentication code}
{export flag}
```

**SSH Server CBC Mode Ciphers Enabled****Description**

The SSH server is configured to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption. This may allow an attacker to recover the plaintext message from the ciphertext.

Note that this plugin only checks for the options of the SSH server and does not check for vulnerable software versions.

**Solution**

Contact the vendor or consult product documentation to disable CBC mode cipher encryption, and enable CTR or GCM cipher mode encryption.

**Affected Systems**

22 / tcp / ssh 190.34.183.129, 190.34.183.142

**Output**

```
The following client-to-server Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) algorithms
are supported :
```

```
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
```

```
The following server-to-client Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) algorithms
are supported :
```

```
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
```

```
The following client-to-server Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) algorithms
are supported :
```

```
3des-cbc
blowfish-cbc
```

```
The following server-to-client Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) algorithms
are supported :
```

```
3des-cbc
blowfish-cbc
```

### **SSL/TLS Diffie-Hellman Modulus <= 1024 Bits (Logjam)**

#### **Description**

The remote host allows SSL/TLS connections with one or more Diffie-Hellman moduli less than or equal to 1024 bits. Through cryptanalysis, a third party may be able to find the shared secret in a short amount of time (depending on modulus size and attacker resources). This may allow an attacker to recover the plaintext or potentially violate the integrity of connections.

#### **Solution**

Reconfigure the service to use a unique Diffie-Hellman moduli of 2048 bits or greater.

#### **Affected Systems**

9443 / tcp / possible_wls	190.34.183.139
443 / tcp / possible_wls	190.34.183.139, 190.34.183.154

#### **Output**



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Vulnerable connection combinations :

```
SSL/TLS version : TLSv1.0
Cipher suite    : TLS1 CK DHE RSA WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Diffie-Hellman MODP size (Bits) : 1024
Warning - This is a known static Oakley Group2 modulus. This may make
the remote host more vulnerable to the Logjam attack.
Logjam attack difficulty : Hard (would require nation-state resources)
```

Vulnerable connection combinations :

```
SSL/TLS version : TLSv1.1
Cipher suite    : TLS1 CK DHE RSA WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Diffie-Hellman MODP size (Bits) : 1024
Warning - This is a known static Oakley Group2 modulus. This may make
the remote host more vulnerable to the Logjam attack.
Logjam attack difficulty : Hard (would require nation-state resources)
```

```
SSL/TLS version : TLSv1.1
Cipher suite    : TLS1 CK DHE RSA WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Diffie-Hellman MODP size (Bits) : 1024
Warning - This is a known static Oakley Group2 modulus. This may make
the remote host more vulnerable to the Logjam attack.
Logjam attack difficulty : Hard (would require nation-state resources)
```

```
SSL/TLS version : TLSv1.0
Cipher suite    : TLS1 CK DHE RSA WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Diffie-Hellman MODP size (Bits) : 1024
Warning - This is a known static Oakley Group2 modulus. This may make
the remote host more vulnerable to the Logjam attack.
Logjam attack difficulty : Hard (would require nation-state resources)
```

```
SSL/TLS version : TLSv1.0
Cipher suite    : TLS1 CK DHE RSA WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Diffie-Hellman MODP size (Bits) : 1024
Warning - This is a known static Oakley Group2 modulus. This may make
the remote host more vulnerable to the Logjam attack.
Logjam attack difficulty : Hard (would require nation-state resources)
```

1000


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**THREATS**

GLESEC uses its MSS-APS, MSS-EPS, MSS-SIEM, MSS-EIR and MSS-UTM to determine threat intelligence activity.

The threats reported by MSS-APS for this month are Anti-Scan, Access, DoS Behavior and Anomalies. All these threats were identified and discarded.



Based on the information gathered from the security measures during this period, Metrobank SA received a total of: 2,878,997 attacks, of which 71,838 are critical, there was a 25% increase in the number of attacks received in this period compared to the month of May (Total attacks: 2,299,931), but a decrease of 28% in critical attacks for this month.

Some of the attacks blocked according to the level of severity are:

- Flood of IPv4 UDP network, access denied due to a malicious request, request of HTTP not compatible with RFC, failure of validation of parameters and SIP-Scanner-SIPVicious, considered of high severity.
- Ping Sweep, TCP Scan, TCP Scan (horizontal) and UDP scan, UDP (horizontal scan) of medium severity.

Frequent and blocked weekly attacks are: Invalid IP, header or full length, ping sweep, SIP-Scanner-SIP Vicious, TCP handshake violation, first non-syn packet, list of threats and UDP IPv4 flood network.

All this was stopped by the security countermeasures administered by GLESEC. Most attacks last less than a minute and are in the Anti-scan and Behavior-DoS

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category; Attacks that last more than 1 hour include: access (violation of access to the blacklist), anti-scanning (TCP scan and horizontal TCP scan) and anomalies.

Most of the attacks are carried out from the following countries: Russian Federation, Panama, the United States, the Netherlands and China; These are mainly destined to the ports: 8545 is destined to explorations with a lot of frequency; if it is not necessary to leave it open, it would be advisable to close it or filter it from traffic from outside, 3389 (RDP: Microsoft Terminal Server), the web access port (8080) and the SSH connection port (22).

The 5 attacking IPs in this period are:

- 188.246.234.60
- 190.34.192.31
- 190.34.192.34
- 92.63.193.100
- 195.43.95.90

The IPs attacked in this period are:

- 190.34.183.135
- 190.34.183.132
- 190.34.183.158
- 190.34.183.137
- 190.34.183.152

Most attacks seem to be recognition (scanning) lasting less than a minute and up to more than an hour. Approximately 91% of the attacks are scanning, which can be considered recognition and is what you prefer for future attacks. The attacks that consume the most amount of bandwidth are the attacks of Anti-Scanning, Access, Behavioral-DoS, Anomalies and Intrusions.

In this period there was a low percentage of attacks:

- Http Flood (HTTP Page Flood Attack) to IPs 190.34.183.149 and 190.34.183.152
- SynFlood (SYN Flood out of context) to IPs 190.34.183.28
- Cracking-Protection (Web Scan, SMTP Scan) to the IPs: 190.34.183.148, 190.34.183.139 and 190.34.183.149.



The DefensePro assisted in preventing attacks directed at network and server level which were directed at well-known port numbers: 8545 (JSON-RPC), 8080 (http-alt), 3389(RDP), 22 (ssh), 1433 (ms-sql), 5060 (sip), 80 (http), 445 (https), 443 (https), in order of frequency for this report period.

#### **Top 5 Source IPs (Local or public).**

- 190.34.192.34
- 190.34.192.31
- 195.43.95.90
- 77.72.82.24
- 77.72.83.235

The most frequent types of attacks were TCP Scan horizontal and vertical mode. The first two IPs comes from Panama and the last two IPs comes from Russia.

#### **Top 10 Destination IPs (Local or public) targeted**

In this section we present the Destination IPs from denied or dropped connections that were most recurrent during this period.

- 190.34.183.135
- 190.34.183.158
- 190.34.183.137
- 190.34.183.132
- 190.34.183.149

*The DefensePro system has operated properly with 100.00% up time and good performance.*





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